Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression by Netanel, Neil W.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 53 
Issue 6 Issue 6 - Symposium: Taking Stock: The 
Law and Economics of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
Article 8 
11-2000 
Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression 
Neil W. Netanel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Neil W. Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1879 (2000) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol53/iss6/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Market Hierarchy and Copyright in
Our System of Free Expression
Neil Weinstock Netanel*
I. INTRODUCTION: MARKET HIERARCHY AND SPEECH .......... 1879
II. Two OBJECTIONS ............................................................. 1886
A. The Internet .......................................................... 1887
B. Speaker Concentration and Diversity ................... 1894
C. • Sum ...................................................................... 1898
III. COPYRIGHT FOSTERS SPEECH HIERARCHY ........................ 1899
A. Copyright's Static Effect ....................................... 1904
B. Copyright's Dynamic Effect ................................... 1911
C. Partial Caveat ...................................................... 1915
D . Sum ...................................................................... 1916
IV. THE FREE PRESS PRINCIPLE ............................................ 1917
V. COPYRIGHT'S PROPER ROLE ............................................. 1926
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................... 1932
I. INTRODUCTION: MARKET HIERARCHY AND SPEECH
If trends of the past two decades persist, a vast inequality of
wealth may well become a fundamental, defining characteristic of
political and social life in many Western democracies, particularly
* Arnold, White & Durkee Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas School of
Law. For their helpful comments, I am indebted to Yochai Benkler, Niva Elkin-Koren, Doug
Lichtman, Christopher Yoo, and participants of the following conferences at which I presented
portions of early drafts of this Article: "aking Stock: The Law and Economics of Intellectual
Property Rights," at Vanderbilt University Law School; "A Free Information Ecology in the Digi-
tal Environment," at New York University School of Law; and the 28th Annual Telecommunica-
tions Policy Research Conference. @Neil W. Netanel, 2000.
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the United States.' Among its potentially pernicious effects, mas-
sive wealth disparity threatens the integrity of the democratic pro-
cess. Liberal democracy aspires to political equality, which de-
mands that opportunities to acquire and assert political power be
widespread and broadly distributed.2 Political equality does not re-
quire economic equality. But political equality may be undermined
by severe disparities of wealth. Absent preventive regulation, pri-
vate wealth buys political power. It enables those with greater pri-
vate means to exercise a disproportionate influence over legislation
and to steer the course of public debate. 3 For that reason, substan-
tial inequalities of wealth may prove fundamentally incompatible
with liberal democratic governance. 4
Concentrations of private wealth and power in communica-
tions and mass media give cause for particular concern. 5 At the cen-
1. See generally Joel F. Handler, Questions About Social Europe by an American Observer,
18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 437 (2000) (chronicling the disintegration of the social welfare state in the
United States and Europe). Among developed democracies, wealth inequality is particularly
pronounced in the United States. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING
AMERICA 1998-99 (1999); Robert M. Solow, Welfare: The Cheapest Country, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Mar. 23, 2000, at 20, available at http://www.nybooks.com/nyrev/WWWarchdisplay.cgi?20000-
323020R.
2. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 224-26 (1971) (discussing "fair opportunity to
take part in and to influence the political process"); Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary
Associations and Democratic Governance, in ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY 7, 36 (Erik Olin
Wright ed., 1995) (liberal democracy posits that "the chances to hold office and to influence po-
litical choices ought to be roughly equal across citizens").
3. See Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 1055, 1058-61 (1999) (presenting a cogent argument that First Amendment ju-
risprudence in the area of campaign financing must be reconfigured to account for the threat to
the democratic process posed by massive wealth disparity).
4. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 60-61 (1985) (arguing that
"when differences in political resources cause citizens to be politically unequal, then that ine-
quality necessarily reveals itself by a violation of the criteria [for democracy]"); see also
BENJAMIN I. PAGE, WHO GETS WHAT FROM GOVERNMENT? 2 (1983) (contending that "extreme
inequalities of income or wealth undermine the values of order and stability, communal har-
mony, liberty, self-fulfillment, and equal opportunity"). Empirical data supports these theorists'
hypotheses. Studies show a strong association between income inequality and the likelihood of
the breakdown of democracy, even independent of a country's level of economic development. See
MARK GRADSTEIN & BRANKO MILANOVIC, DOES LIBERTt = EGALT]? A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE ON THE LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 17 (Univer-
sity of Munich, Ctr. for Econ. Studies Working Paper No. 261, 2000) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.taf?22567&_UserReference=A7FA65BC8A15900339F927D
(citing Edward N. Muller, Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality, 53 AM.
SOC. REV. 50 (1988)).
5. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 174-92 (4th ed. 1992); OWEN M. FISS,
LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 9-20 (1996);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17-51 (1993); see also ERNST-
WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, STATE, SOCIETY, AND LIBERTY: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 250 (J.A. Underwood trans., 1991) (discussing, within the framework of
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ter of our understandings of political equality and democratic gov-
ernance lies what might be termed the "Free Speech Principle," the
idea that liberal democracy both depends upon and is largely mani-
fested by "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate6 from "di-
verse and antagonistic sources. ' 7 Underlying the Free Speech Prin-
ciple is the empirical assumption that, at least in the long run, only
diverse and antagonistic sources will likely give play to a full pano-
ply of competing views, calling to task established 6lites and chal-
lenging settled positions and understandings.
Wealth inequality, commentators have cogently argued, sub-
verts the Free Speech Principle in a number of ways. The first con-
cerns disparity in the ability to make oneself heard. At least until
the emergence of the Internet, only those who have owned or had
meaningful access to a mass media outlet have been able to reach
an extended audience.8 Yet for most people, the cost of acquiring
access to the mass media is prohibitive. As a result, effective com-
munication in the modern era has been overwhelmingly the prov-
ince of economically powerful entities and individuals (and the gov-
ernment) .9
German political theory and constitutional law, the threat that concentration of publicly funded
and privately owned media poses for freedom of information and opinion); Jerome A. Barron,
Access to the Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967) (arguing for a
twentieth-century interpretation of the First Amendment imposing affirmative responsibilities
on newspapers to act as sounding boards for new ideas and old grievances).
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
7. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (arguing that the First Amend-
ment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public"); cf. JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY, ch. 2 (1859) (emphasizing the need to allow ample expression of competing views if
truth is to emerge). As Christopher Yoo rightly points out in his Comment, there are various
rationales for the First Amendment protection of free speech. Christopher Yoo, Netanel's Demo-
cratic Theory of Copyright: A Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2000). In focusing on the
importance of free speech for liberal democracy, I do not mean to suggest that the instrumental
value of free speech for democratic institutions is the sole rationale underlying our free speech
jurisprudence. I mean merely to say that there is a widespread belief, a belief I share, that ex-
pressive diversity is both a precondition for and an element of liberal democracy. Contrary to
Professor Yoo's contention, it does not follow from that proposition-and neither do I argue-that
the value of expressive diversity for democracy is the only reason we ought to protect free speech.
The proposition merely supposes that we want robust democratic institutions (and, therefore,
ought to consider how markets and regulatory regimes impact upon them) even if we believe that
individual autonomy or some other good constitutes the ultimate purpose of those institutions
and of free speech protections.
8. As I will discuss, moreover, the extent to which the Internet is likely to overcome this
barrier has been greatly exaggerated by some commentators. See infra text accompanying notes
26-48.
9. See Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First
Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1083,
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This intertwining of wealth and speaker, commentators ar-
gue, narrows and skews public debate. 10 When only the wealthy
control newspapers and television stations, media content reflects
the views and interests of the wealthy. Most strikingly, media mo-
guls like William Randolph Hearst and Robert Murdoch may use
their vast media holdings to trumpet their personal views and
causes." More subtly and systematically, media conglomerates
strategically administer their content portfolios to exploit synergies
and maximize portfolio value. To one degree or another, they both
favor the content of corporate affiliates at the expense of independ-
ent producers 2 and tailor content to suit non-media corporate par-
ents, affiliates, and partners.' As media enterprise consolidation
and vertical integration proceed apace, such potential distortions
become more likely and more insidious.
1099-105 (1999) (describing the problem of unequal media access, but arguing that the risks in
government mandated access outweigh its benefits).
10. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 390-92, 407-10; Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1412-13 (1986); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech,
81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1150-54 (1993).
11. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use. First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 378 (1999) (citing anecdotal evidence
that Hearst and Murdoch used their media holdings in this fashion).
12. See Lili Levi, Reflections on the FCC's Recent Approach to Structural Regulation of the
Electronic Mass Media, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 581, 597-98 (2000) (noting that consolidated con-
glomerates, such as that composed of Viacom and CBS, may prefer their entities' own content
and thus discourage independent investment in content production); see also Lawrie Mifflin,
CBS-Viacom Deal Raises Competition Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at C1 (reporting
television executives' views that favoritism for affiliates exists, but varies in degree depending on
the circumstances and entities involved).
In addition to maximizing the value of content, enterprises have an incentive to favor affili-
ates in order to economize on marketing and transaction costs. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS -AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 20-40 (1975) (presenting
the general proposition that vertical integration may often be undertaken to minimize a variety
of pre- and post-contracting transactions costs); Douglas Gomery, The Economics of Hollywood-
Money and Media, in MEDIA ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 175, 179 (Alison Alexander et
al. eds., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter MEDIA ECONOMICS] (noting that vertical integration in the
motion picture industry enables a company to take full advantage of cost reductions associated
with not having to sell content to third-party distributors and outlets).
13. Commentators present considerable anecdotal evidence of media enterprises withhold-
ing criticism of advertisers and affiliates and modifying content to promote those entities' prod-
ucts. See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 50-56 (1994) (presenting
anecdotes of self-censorship by the press to avoid offending advertisers); C. Edwin Baker, The
Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 362 (1998) (noting pressure to favor non-
media partners). For a discussion of the practice of giving placement to advertiser and affiliate
products in films, see Stephen L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood
Turning Films into Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 304-08; Mark Crispin Miller,
Hollywood: The Ad, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1990, at 41, 48-49.
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Of course, media owners do not merely trumpet their own
views and aim to maximize corporate synergies. To a significant
degree, they also seek to tailor content to audience tastes.' 4 But
even when they do so, media owners systematically favor audiences
who are most able and likely either to pay for content or to pur-
chase media advertisers' products and services.' 5 For this reason as
well, the commercial mass media will be likely to underproduce
content reflecting the views, sensitivities, and tastes of the poor.16
Wealth disparity among potential audiences impacts public debate
no less than wealth disparity among content producers.
Finally, over and above the distortive effect of wealth dis-
parity per se, the market may generate a mix of expression that
broadly supports the status quo. Commercial media, critics assert,
routinely produce bland, uncontroversial expression, designed to
put audiences in a buying mood and to attract a broad cross-section
of viewers, readers, and listeners without unduly offending any of
them. 17 To the extent that criticism holds true, even a competitive
media marketplace may ultimately serve entrenched corporate and
14. It is sometimes argued that in a competitive market, consumer demand, not producer
predilection, ultimately determines what speech the media produces and disseminates. For
example, in his classic article arguing for broadcast deregulation, former FCC Chairman Mark
Fowler contended that the government "should rely on the broadcasters' ability to determine the
wants of their audiences through the normal mechanisms of the marketplace." Mark S. Fowler
& Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 210
(1982); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(contending that regulations that tie minority ownership of broadcast stations to expressive
diversity are unconstitutional because broadcasters are rational economic actors, and it would be
impermissible racial stereotyping to assume that minority broadcasters would broadcast a dif-
ferent mix of content than whites). As Ed Baker has convincingly argued, however, the classic
price-system model of consumer demand ill fits the media market. See C. Edwin Baker, Giving
the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 316-46 (1997) (contending that media prod-
ucts' public good characteristics, the reliance of many media on advertising, and expression's role
in preference formation leads the media market to deviate substantially from the classic model of
consumer demand); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV.
499, 514-22 (2000) (detailing ways in which television market differs from markets for non-
expressive consumer products).
15. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 66-69 (detailing newspapers' and magazines' tailoring of
content to readership sought by advertisers); TODD GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 208 (1983) (de-
scribing CBS cancellation of highly-rated programs when revised Nielsen ratings revealed that
the programs appealed disproportionately to elderly and rural viewers rather than younger,
urban audiences that earned more and spent more).
16. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 17-21 (noting newspapers' failure to target poor, minority
audiences); Weinberg, supra note 10, at 1153-54 (aptly concluding that "the 'marketplace of
ideas' [that] the mass media creates.., is as democratic as a political voting system weighted by
income").
17. See, e.g., GITLIN, supra note 15; Barron, supra note 5, at 1641-47; see also JAMES G.
WEBSTER & PATRICIA F. PHALEN, THE MASS AUDIENCE: REDISCOVERING THE DOMINANT MODEL
101 (1997) (stating that "[m]any contemporary analysts from both ends of the political spectrum
have portrayed the media as inexorably committed to the production of standardized content!').
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commercial interests, and may overwhelmingly reflect the values
and culture of dominant social and ethnic groups, at the expense of
outlying minorities and the poor.' 8 At the very least, such main-
streaming is unlikely to provide adequate expression to minority
interests and concerns. More insidiously, it might help to engender
a widespread sense of complacency and a diminished capacity to
envision potential challenges to the status quo.19
In sum, absent preventative regulation, market hierarchy-
the perennial condition of substantial inequality of wealth-trans-
lates inevitably into what I will refer to as "speech hierarchy"-the
disproportionate power of wealthy speakers and audiences to de-
termine the mix of speech that comprises our public discourse. By
effectively silencing outlying minorities and the poor, speech hier-
archy runs directly counter to the Free Speech Principle. It pro-
duces a mix of speech that neither encompasses a wide, representa-
tive spectrum of viewpoint nor carries the voices of diverse and an-
tagonistic sources. If sufficiently severe, speech hierarchy may thus
subvert liberal democratic values and governance.
Of course, the above depiction and critique of our communi-
cations landscape is not uncontroversial. And even those who share
the concern that private wealth skews public debate disagree
sharply over what, if anything, ought to be done about it. The con-
troversy generally centers on government media policy: To what
extent should government-and to what extent may government
consistently with the First Amendment-regulate commercial me-
dia or subsidize noncommercial media to promote uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open debate from diverse and antagonistic sources? 20
My goal in this Article is not to rehearse the arguments re-
garding speech hierarchy and how traditional government media
policy should address it, although I will have something to say on
these points. My focus rather will be on copyright law. I will exam-
ine copyright's role in contributing to speech hierarchy. In so doing,
18. See Weinberg, supra note 10, at 1152-53 (noting that media coverage may seem broad
because it is all we know and that it may seem broader to those who generally share mainstream
views than those who do not).
19. See W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE MASS AUDIENCE 28-30 (1991) (summa-
rizing the viewpoint of critical media theorists and other critics that commercial media trivial-
izes political life).
20. Compare, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Per-
sons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57 (arguing that certain government regulation of media
structure and content to promote expressive diversity and robust debate is both sound policy and
constitutional), with Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amend.
ment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1997) (contending that media regulation is merely disguised rent
allocation and should be presumptively invalid under the First Amendment).
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I do not mean to bracket off media policy. Rather I aim to cast copy-
right within the ambit of government media and information
policy.21
Nor do I argue that speech hierarchy is an entirely bad thing
for liberal democracy. I contend, indeed, that some degree of hierar-
chy, some concentration of expressive power in media enterprises,
is the price we must pay if the press is to be able to fulfill its vital
watchdog and agenda-setting roles. The commercial media falls far
short of perfection in fulfilling those roles. Nevertheless, liberal
democracy requires media enterprises that are independent from
state support and that possess the financial wherewithal to reach a
mass audience, galvanize public opinion, and engage in sustained
investigative reporting and critique (what we might term the "Free
Press Principle") no less than it requires wide-open debate from di-
verse sources (the Free Speech Principle). A "system of freedom of
expression" in a modern democratic state requires a pluralism of
types of voice, including well-heeled, mainstream commercial me-
dia, as well as government subsidized non-commercial media, inde-
pendent publishers, political and nonprofit associations, universi-
ties, and individuals. 22 Such a system is a complex mechanism. In
order to engender the shared understandings required for public
discourse, it must necessarily comprise mainstream-and main-
streaming-expression that addresses a limited set of broadly cog-
nizable issues. Yet in order to maintain a democratic society's vi-
tality and equity, a system of free expression must also nurture mi-
nority and marginal speech capable of propelling new issues and
perspectives onto the public stage. That system must include pow-
erful commercial media able to stand up to other centers of power,
both governmental and private. But it must also provide ample
room for speakers capable of prodding the commercial media and of
offsetting its mainstream impulse.
21. In so doing, I build in part on my prior work, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and
a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996) (contending that "copyright is in es-
sence a state measure that uses market institutions to enhance the democratic character of civil
society"), and in part on the instructive work of others, see generally, e.g., Benkler, supra note 11
(viewing copyright within a broader system of free expression); Jessica Litman, Reforming In-
formation Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587 (1997) (emphasizing that copy-
right law cannot be viewed apart from information policy).
22. As Thomas Emerson emphasized some three decades ago, liberal democracy must en-
compass and nurture a "system of freedom of expression," comprising various speech-related
rights, institutions, and types of speakers, and requiring affirmative state support as well as
limitations on the power of the state to abridge speech rights. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3-5 (1970).
2000] 1885
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,Given these multifarious and divergent needs, to the extent
that speech hierarchy supports the Free Press Principle but runs
counter to the Free Speech Principle, copyright law and media pol-
icy must seek to moderate between the two. They must enable, and
indeed support, a degree of market hierarchy in the expressive sec-
tor. But at the same time, they must seek to ameliorate the most
deleterious effects of media concentration and to foster expression
from a broad spectrum of adverse and antagonistic sources.
This Article begins with the concern that speech hierarchy
threatens the Free Speech Principle. In so doing, it largely takes as
a given the depiction of speech hierarchy outlined above. In Part II,
however, I briefly consider and refute two salient objections to that
depiction. The first is that the Internet promises a new era of
"cheap speech" in which anyone can be an effective speaker. The
second is that speaker concentration actually enhances the diver-
sity of expressive content. In Part III, I examine copyright's role.
Copyright, I contend, affords content producers considerable mar-
ket power and contributes significantly to speech hierarchy. In Part
IV, I turn to the Free Press Principle, fleshing out the argument
that some concentration of private wealth and power in the expres-
sive sector is a necessary condition for liberal democracy. In Part V,
I contend that as an integral part of government media policy,
copyright entitlements should be tailored to support an independ-
ent media, while limiting copyright holders market power in order
to preserve space for expressive diversity. I suggest, indeed, that in
an age of digital and global communication, a properly tailored
copyright might serve in some respects as a more effective tool for
modulating between speech hierarchy and expressive diversity than
would traditional media regulation.
II. Two OBJECTIONS
The Free Speech Principle posits that expressive diversity
and robust debate are vital to democratic governance. But in an un-
regulated market, wealth disparity skews public discourse in favor
of speakers with the financial wherewithal to own a mass media
outlet and consumers likely to buy speech and the products that
advertisers want to sell. In the face of this political and market
failure, it is incumbent upon the state actively to promote expres-
[Vol. 53:6:18791886
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sive diversity. Indeed, the media policies of the United States and
other democratic nations purport in large part to serve this aim.2 3
I cannot fully develop or defend these propositions here. Nor
can I contribute to the ongoing debate concerning the efficacy of
government media policy in actually furthering expressive diver-
sity.2 4 But I do want to consider and reject two particularly salient
challenges to the idea that market hierarchy subverts the Free
Speech Principle. This first is the notion that the Internet will ef-
fectively eliminate market hierarchy in speech. The second is the
claim that it is speaker concentration, not attempts to give voice to
adverse and antagonistic sources, that best enhances expressive
diversity.
A. The Internet
The early Internet promised, and to a large extent delivered,
a communications revolution. Previously only the very wealthy
could reach a mass audience. But the availability of digital net-
works drastically reduces entry costs into the mass communication
market. Today, almost anyone with Internet access can communi-
cate to and with a global audience. While it should not be forgotten
that the prerequisite of Internet access continues to leave behind
most of the world's population, including many in developed coun-
tries, 25 millions can now participate in the abundance of web sites,
virtual discussion groups, and other fora freely available online.
23. For examples involving the United States, see Jerome A. Barron, Structural Regulation
of the Media and the Diversity Rationale, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 555 (2000); Benkler, supra note 11,
at 364-86. Regarding the United Kingdon, see Broadcasting Act, 1996, ch. 55, § 19(2)(b) (Eng.),
which provides that digital program licenses shall be subject to the condition that "in each year
not less than 10 per cent of the total amount of time allocated to the broadcasting of qualifying
programmes included in the service is allocated to the broadcasting of a range and diversity of
independent productions." Regarding the European Union, see generally Gillian Doyle, From
'Pluralism' to 'Ownership'- Europe's Emergent Policy on Media Concentrations Navigates the
Doldrums, 1997(3) J. INFO. L. & TECH. 3, available at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jfltcomms-
reg97_3doylI.
24. For criticism of the United States' media policy, see, for example, THOMAS G.
KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 277-96 (1994)
(maintaining that efforts of the FCC, courts, and Congress to regulate broadcast programming
reflect poor regulatory policy); Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment.- An Essay for
the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 908-45 (1998) (presenting critical survey of broadcast and cable
regulation); Weinberg, supra note 10, at 1110-30 (discussing history of the United States' broad-
cast regulatory system and its current structure).
25. See Clive Walker & Yaman Akdeniz, Virtual Democracy, PUB. L., Autumn 1998, at 501
(noting that much of the world's population has no connection to the telephone infrastructure, let
alone the Internet); see also NATIONAL TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
FALLING THROUGH THE NET: DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE, at viii (1999) (finding significant
disparities in Internet access across wealth, ethnic, and geographic lines in the United States).
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The result is the cacophony of diverse voices that has come to char-
acterize the Internet.
Critics of government efforts to promote expressive diversity
in mass communication maintain that the abundance of "cheap
speech" on the Internet renders government media regulation un-
necessary and constitutionally infirm.26 On the Net, they empha-
size, everyone can be a speaker and everyone can find a wealth of
diverse expression and information. Concomitantly, they point out,
the Internet drastically reduces the control of publishers, broad-
casters, newspapers, bookstores, and other private intermediaries
over what speakers will say and audiences will hear. In cyberspace,
authors can communicate directly to readers, and readers can freely
become authors, not only selecting what they read but also re-
sponding to it.27 In this new, richly pluralist information market-
place, critics claim, the speech hierarchy rationale for government
regulation and intervention no longer holds. 28
As I have detailed elsewhere, however, the critics' portrait of
a highly democratic Internet bears scant resemblance to what much
of the Internet is rapidly becoming.29 The Internet, indeed, is poised
to change in ways that will bring back many of the structural char-
acteristics of the predigital mass media market. Our communica-
tions universe, to be certain, will continue to feature a lively and
widely diverse array of virtual street corner podia, including email
discussion groups, chat rooms, individual web sites, and other fora
heretofore unimagined. But the recent Tsunami wave of telecom-
munications and media company mergers, capped as of this writing
by America Online's acquisition of Time Warner, portend domina-
tion by a few corporate behemoths, online as well as off. Akin to
today's mass media markets, purveyors of broadband access to
high-production-value video and audio content will likely determine
who can provide what content through which distribution channels.
If current trends continue, indeed, the communications market will
exhibit unprecedented levels of vertical as well as horizontal inte-
gration, enabling each telecommunications conglomerate to provide
26. See, e.g., Redish & Kaludis, supra note 9, at 1129-31; Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and
What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1836-38, 1843-50 (1995).
27. See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Technology and Democracy, 64 SOC. RES. 1313
(1997) (emphasizing decentralized, interactive capabilities of cyberspace communication).
28. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1670 (1998); Volokh, supra note 26, at 1836-37.
29. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View From Lib-
eral Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 440-42, 463-64 (2000).
1888 [Vol. 53:6:1879
MARKET HIERARCHYAND COPYRIGHT
and exercise control over a full component of access, distribution,
and content. 30
As a result, those seeking to reach a mass audience will need
to do so through conglomerate-controlled outlets. They will have to
attempt to license their speech to a conglomerate-owned content
provider or purchase communications capacity from a conglomer-
ate-owned portal. In each case, they will compete against conglom-
erate affiliates, which, for reasons of management predisposition
and transaction cost savings, will often enjoy preferential treatment
from their corporate partner.31 Alternatively, like the recent sale of
Africana.com to Time Warner,32 small, independent speakers will
seek to be acquired by major media/telecommunications firms, fur-
ther extending conglomerate reach. In such a world, speaking in
virtual street corners will be much like handing out leaflets on an
urban street corner and independent web publishing will be akin to
small, independent press and book publishing. While continuing to
occupy a respected position in our system of free expression,33 they
will largely be lost in the din of Disney-ABC, AT&T-Media One,
CBS-Viacom, and AOL-Time Warner.
Of course, neither telecommunications-media concentration
nor corporate dominance of online and offline communications arise
spontaneously and inevitably. Rather, like the emergence and
growth of the Internet itself,34 they are largely products of govern-
30. See Measuring a Combined ViacomICBS Against Other Media Giants, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 8, 1999, at C15 (presenting chart showing vertical integration among media conglomerates
prior to the AOL-Time Warner merger); And Who Might Be Next?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at
C10 (presenting table of media, information technology, and Internet companies likely to partici-
pate in mergers and alliances following the AOL-Time Warner merger). Similar concerns have
been raised about concentration in Europe's new media market. See, e.g., Carles Llorens-
Maluquer, European Responses to Bottlenecks in Digital Pay-T:V. Impacts on Pluralism and
Competition Policy, 16 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 557, 570-72 (1998).
31. See supra note 12; see also Helen Thorpe, The Assault of the Salonistas, N.Y. TIMEs
MAG., Feb. 20, 2000, at 42 (reporting on difficulties faced by pioneer online magazine Salon,
including possible loss of placement on AOL as a result of the sharply increased price for place-
ment and the future possibility that AOL will provide placement only for Time Warner maga-
zines).
32. See David R. Kirkpatrick, Co-Founders of Africana.com Sell Venture to Time Warner,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2000, at C2 (reporting that Harvard University professors Henry Louis
Gates, Jr. and Kwame Anthony Appiah, founders of Africana.com, a web site devoted to Africa
and the African diaspora, have sold their venture to Time Warner Inc. in order to keep the site
alive).
33. For a discussion on the function and political import of "marginal public spheres" cen-
tered around non-mass media publications and discussion groups, see generally Susan Herbst,
Public Expression Outside the Mainstream, 546 ANNALS 120 (1996).
34. The Internet began as a United States Department of Defense initiative. See Steve
Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant.- How the Federal Government Created Microsoft, Personal
Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1999). Its use remains heavily subsidized by
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ment policy: in part government subsidy and licensing, in part the
removal of regulatory obstacles and conditions to telecommunica-
tions and media company mergers, 35 and in part government de-
limitation, allocation, and enforcement of proprietary rights in con-
tent, distribution channels, and expressive capacity. 36 That is not to
say, however, that government encouragement of and acquiescence
in telecommunications-media conglomeration comprise its primary,
underlying cause. Rather, various market dictates and technologi-
cal developments exert a powerful centripetal force in the expres-
sive sector, fueling concentration and corporate dominance in online
communications, just as, and possibly even more so than, they do
offline.
Among those market factors is intense competition for "user
eyeballs." In a world awash in "cheap speech," audience attention
becomes an exceedingly scarce and highly sought-after resource.3 7
Internet users are awash in more information and expression than
they can possibly process. As a result, they are highly reliant on
tools, including search engines, links, desktop icons, advertising,
brand recognition, and familiar, well-known expressive elements
that reduce their search costs.
Commercial players are better positioned than noncommer-
cial speakers to gain and keep user attention by exploiting users'
inertia and need for search-cost reducing tools. Content producers
face vociferous competition to draw Internet users to their portals
and web sites and to retain those users as long as possible. 38 Ulti-
mately, like in the offline world, it is the large commercial players
the public fisc and by telecommunications regulations maintaining cross-subsidies from tele-
phone and other non-Internet services. See id. at 45-55, 82-83.
35. See Levi, supra note 12, at 582 (noting that the recent wave of media enterprise mergers
"would not have been possible without the deregulatory turn in mass media policy that began
with the Fowler Commission in the Reagan era and was codified in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996").
36. For an insightful discussion of the far-reaching implications of government determina-
tion of whether communications infrastructure is to be governed by a license, property, or com-
mons regime, see generally Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of
the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (1998).
37. As Bill Gates presciently describes the Internees near future: "If a stranger... wants
to send you [electronic] mail, [he'll] have to put up a certain amount of money in order to get you
to read it because your time is the valuable resource." Bill Gates, Public Lecture (Nov. 1995),
quoted in ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: How THE INTERNET IS PUTTING
INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 130 (1999).
38. See SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 98-99 (describing efforts of search engine companies to
keep users at portal sites); see also A CBS Internet Portal Builds In Data for Ads, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1999, at C14 (reporting that in order to induce Internet users to visit its new portal, CBS
will expend $70 million in advertising and will give visitors chances to win cash prizes).
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who succeed in capturing the lion's share of audience attention.39
Only they have the financial and organizational resources to adver-
tise their products, exploit product and corporate partner synergies,
purchase first position in search engine search results and promi-
nent placement of their icons on portal desktops, populate the
Internet with links to their sites, and produce star-studded, atten-
tion-grabbing content. 40
In addition, emerging Internet technologies give large com-
mercial players significant additional advantages in the market for
user attention. Prominent among these technologies, high speed
modems, digital signal compression, and broadband infrastructure,
make possible the transmission of high-quality video
programming, 41 rendering the next generation Internet largely in-
distinguishable from tomorrow's high-definition, interactive televi-
sion.42 The virtual leafleter or independent online magazine will
thus have to compete for user attention with slick, expensive video
programming, as well as with the full array of commercial player
39. According to Nielson//Netratings, aside from portal sites such as AOL and Yahoo!
(which were, respectively, the first and second most visited web sites during August 2000), the
top five visited sites during August 2000 were those operated by Microsoft, Disney, Time War-
ner, Amazon.com, and NBC Internet. See Nielson//Netratings, Apparel and Sports Categories
Led Internet Traffic Gains In August, According To Nielsen//Netratings, Sept. 12, 2000 (table of
'Top 25 Web Sites, Month of August 2000, Combined Home and Work"), available at
http://63.140.238.20/press_releases/pr_000914.htm; see also Andrew Chin, Making the World
Wide Web Safe for Democracy: A Medium-Specific First Amendment Analysis, 19 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 309, 322-25 (1997) (presenting evidence of corporate domination of the World
Wide Web based on surveys of users' web site visits and Internet links).
40. See Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1179
(1999) (concluding aptly that given the increasing cost of attracting users to one's web site, "de-
scribing today's World Wide Web as a free and open forum of equal speech is a bit delusional").
For a discussion of some such strategies, see SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 95-96. See also Lucas D.
Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines Matters,
16(3) INFORMATION SOc'Y 169 (2000) (discussing the search engine bias towards firms with re-
sources to gain prominent placement in search results); Alec Klein, AOL Restrictions Alleged,
WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2000, at El (reporting America Online executive's statement that it is
common business practice for AOL to prohibit AOL partners from linking to sites that compete
with AOL or other AOL partners); cf. Arthur de Van & W. David Walls, Uncertainty in the Movie
Industry: Does Star Power Reduce the Terror of the Box Office?, 23 J. CULTURAL ECON. 285, 315
(1999) (concluding that the presence of a star in a full-length motion picture increases the odds,
but far from guarantees, that the picture will be a commercial success).
41. See generally DEBORAH A. LATHEN, FCC, BROADBAND TODAY (1999) (discussing then-
current state of broadband industry and technology), available at http://www.fcc.gov/-
Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf; Edward D. Horwitz, The Ascent of Content, in THE
FUTURE OF THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 91, 96-101 (Derek Leebaert ed., 1998).
42. See SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 99-100 (discussing WebTV, a technology purchased by
Microsoft in 1997, that offers basic Internet access over a television and a menu of channels
accessible through a specially designed remote control); Michael Lewis, Boom Box, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Aug. 13, 2000, at 36 (describing expected transformation of television into Internet-like
medium of vast user-directed choice).
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marketing strategies and corporate partner synergies described
above.
In sum, while it costs little to participate in virtual street
corner podia, those who wish to use online communications to reach
a mass audience face significant entry cost barriers. That factor, in
turn, greatly magnifies the market power of telecommunications,
information technology, and media conglomerates that establish an
early dominating presence in the new digital media. 43 At the same
time, moreover, the market for Internet-delivered expression shares
with offline media markets structural characteristics that exert a
powerful force towards content producer and distributor consolida-
tion. First, the negligible marginal cost of Internet connection and
communication, coupled with the high front-end costs of content
production and infrastructure construction, gives rise to significant
economies of scale for the business of producing and disseminating
information. Commercial players capable of spreading content pro-
duction, infrastructure construction, and other fixed, market-entry
costs over a mass customer base enjoy significant competitive ad-
vantages over those who cannot.4 Second, demand-side tipping,
among both advertisers and viewers, towards speakers with the
largest audience further entrenches large commercial players in
many content sectors.45 As a result of these and other factors, online
markets already exhibit the marked dominance of heavily branded
43. Cf. David P.T. Young, Modeling Media Markets: How Important is Market Structure?,
13(1) J. MEDIA ECON. 27, 29-30, 37 (2000) (noting that media and other markets characterized by
incumbent concentration and significant entry costs generally lack the "contestability" required
to discipline incumbents).
44. As economists have long recognized, "where technology creates significant economies of
scale, markets tend towards dominance by a few large players." Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cy-
berspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of 'Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 522
(1998). Economies of scale are already pronounced in traditional media markets. See JAMES N.
ROSSE & JAMES N. DERTOUZOS, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN MASS COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES 55-78
(1978) (contending that economies of scale have contributed greatly to prevalence of single news-
paper local markets in the United States); Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of
Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1491 (1996) (noting substan-
tial economies of scale in broadcasting); Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. et al, Market Power in Radio
Markets: An Empirical Analysis of Local and National Concentration, 43 J.L. & ECON. 157 (2000)
(enumerating economic efficiencies of concentration in radio station ownership); Eric W. Rothen-
buhler & John M. Streck, The Economics of the Music Industry, in MEDIA ECONOMICS, supra
note 12, at 199, 213-15 (discussing economies of scale and barrier to entry in recorded music
industry).
45. Regarding advertiser tipping, see BAKER, supra note 13, at 7-43, who contends that ad-
vertiser stampedes to the local paper with the largest circulation have contributed to the demise
of newspaper competition in many locations; Randolph E. Bucklin et al., Games of Survival in
the US Newspaper Industry, 21 APPLIED ECON. 631, 636 (1989), who states that newspapers'
reliance on advertising increases the instability of competitive equilibrium in two-newspaper
localities. On consumer tipping, see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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providers characteristic of winner-take-all markets. 46 As commer-
cial players and video-delivery technology assume an increasing
role in Internet communications, the Internet will likely tend, even
more than today and possibly even more than offline media, toward
oligopoly and monopoly.47 Thus, while predicting the future of a
complex, global organism like the Internet can only be a highly pre-
carious task, it does seem increasingly improbable that the Internet
will radically undermine speech hierarchy.
Finally, while my principal aim in this Section is simply to
dispel the notion that the Internet offers a panacea for the problem
of speech hierarchy, it is worth noting another point as well. Inter-
net speaker concentration, like speaker concentration offline, does
not necessarily correlate with what we might surmise is exogenous
consumer demand for speakers' expressive products. 48 Rather it
arises largely from a complex interplay of structural market charac-
teristics and existing disparities of wealth. As we have seen,
speaker concentration on the Internet reflects the ubiquity of con-
sumer search costs, producer entry barriers, supply-side economies
of scale, and demand-side tipping. And to the extent that concentra-
tion does reflect consumer preferences for particular types of ex-
pression (such as star-studded, high-production-value video), ex-
isting offline distributions of wealth, production capacity, and cor-
porate partnering provide conglomerate players with far greater
capability than independents of producing that expression and thus
of furthering conglomerate dominance of speech.
46. See Erik Brynjolfsson & Michael D. Smith, Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of
Internet and Conventional Retailers, 46 MGMT. SC. 563, 577-79 (2000), available at
http://ecommerce.mit.edu/papers/friction/friction.pdf; Lada A. Adamic & Bernardo A. Huberman,
The Nature of Markets in the World Wide Web, at ftp://ftp.parc.xerox.com/pub/dynamics/web-
markets.pdf (May 6, 1999) (finding that the top five percent of Internet web sites account for
almost 75% of user volume); James G. Webster & Shu-Fang Lin, Internet Audiences: Some Fea-
tures of Mass Behavior 6 (July 25, 2000) (unpublished paper, on file with author) (finding that
the top 200 web sites out of the 1,766 sites studied accounted for roughly half of all user visits).
Such asymmetrical distributions are common to television programs, magazines, records, and
other cultural products. Webster & Lin, supra, at 5-6.
47. For an early prediction of this development, see Weinberg, supra note 10, at 1203. See
also Chin, supra note 39, at 318-29 (noting corporate domination of the web and presenting a
mathematical model suggesting that web linking leads to concentration).
48. Indeed, given the social, culturally grounded nature of speech and speech consumption,
the very notion of exogenous consumer preference might be considerably more suspect in the
market for expression than in other areas. See Baker, supra note 14, at 321-22 (noting that
speech consumers often seek edifying, preference-shaping speech); Cohen, supra note 44, at 553-
54 (discussing endogeneity of consumer preference generally); see also infra notes 100-03 and
accompanying text (discussing solidarity and associative characteristics of expressive products).
2000] 1893
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
B. Speaker Concentration and Diversity
A common reading of the Free Speech Principle equates ex-
pressive diversity with speaker diversity; we will have "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" debate only if our system of free expression
provides effective speech outlets for "diverse and antagonistic
sources." In marked contrast, however, a number of commentators
have contended that media monopolists would provide greater ex-
pressive diversity than do media enterprises in competitive mar-
kets, and indeed that there is a positive correlation between media
concentration and expressive diversity.49 If that contention is true,
then expressive pluralism and wide-open debate may not, in fact,
depend upon the presence of diverse and antagonistic speakers and
speech distributors. That means, to return to the context of online
speech, that even if Disney-ABC and AOL-Time Warner do come to
dominate the Internet, they will likely offer a spectrum of opinion
and genre that is just as broad, if not broader, than they would ob-
tain in a realm of speaker plurality. If that is so, government regu-
lation designed to counter media consolidation, whether online or
off, may be ineffective and ill-advised.
To be certain, the number of media owners and outlets need
not necessarily correlate with diversity of expressive product. Nev-
ertheless, contrary to the monopoly-yields-diversity contention, the
economic literature, both theoretic and empirical, in fact suggests
that considerable ownership concentration would produce far less
expressive diversity than would a speech universe comprising a
multitude of yeomen speakers, somewhat like that which was ob-
tained on the early Internet. For one, the notion that media mo-
nopolies would provide greater diversity is based on economic model
assumptions that bear little relevance to actual conditions in to-
day's media markets. Game theoretic and monopolistic competition
models predict greater diversity among broadcaster monopolists on
the assumptions that viewers are unwilling to watch anything but
first choices, that viewers' first choices are highly skewed, and that
49. See, e.g., Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Posner, J.) (It has long been understood that monopoly in broadcasting could actually promote
rather than retard programming diversity."); Chen, supra note 44, 1448-49 (asserting that the
"positive correlation between concentration and diverse programming testifies to the unpredict-
ability of regulatory strategies that aim to offset uneven levels of market power" in media mar-
kets); cf Yoo, supra note 7 (describing models that employ game theory and principles of mo-
nopolistic competition to show that the relationship between media concentration and expressive
diversity is quite complex).
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the number of channels is quite limited.50 But when any of these
assumptions are substantially relaxed, the models predict that
competitors will produce as much or more programming that would
appeal to minority tastes than would monopolists. 51 In particular,
competition can be expected to produce a greater range of diverse
programming than would concentration in an online environment
characterized by heterogenous consumer tastes and vast numbers
of web sites and other virtual channels. 52
In addition, the economic models presuppose that media
firms operate as rational market actors. Neoinstitutional economics
literature suggests, however, that a concentrated market composed
of large integrated firms will often underproduce controversial and
minority-oriented content even if rational actors would do other-
wise. Intrafirm agency costs and bureaucratic organizational struc-
ture lead the management of large, dominant firms to exhibit con-
siderable risk-aversion in pursuing product innovation. 53 That pro-
50. See Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 293, 304-19 (1991) (presenting an instructive and detailed survey of the economic literature
on this point).
51. See id. Not surprisingly, as Spitzer notes, under these models "intermediate cases yield
intermediate results." Id. at 317; see also WEBSTER & PHALEN, supra note 17, at 103 (noting that
economic models of audience behavior suggest that competition need not lead to uniform content
catering only to the broadest possible audience when "the number of channels, and hence com-
peting services, is unconstrained").
52. In addition, research suggests that audience choices depend in large part on what others
of their social group are watching, listening to, and reading. See infra notes 100-03 and accom-
panying text. Thus, to the extent the economic models depend upon a view of consumer choice as
exogenous to beth the expressive mix and to the choices of other consumers, those models may
have weakened predictive value.
53. The principal innovation-reducing agency cost is that managers can expect little pecuni-
ary reward if a risky research and development project succeeds, but significant reputational
cost if the project fails. Bureaucracy costs include communication and coordination costs, a pro-
pensity to engage in excessive control management, and slowness to identify and counter incom-
petency. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 135-53 (1985)
(discussing agency and bureaucracy costs and their adverse impact on incentives to innovate);
WILLIAMSON, supra note 12, at 200-01 (concluding, after review of the literature and discussion of
large firm organization, that "innovation-which is a poorly structured, high-risk activity-may
not be an activity that the large, mature bureaucracy is constitutionally well-suited to handle");
Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, in MARKETS FOR INNOVATION, OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL 131 (Richard H. Day et al. eds., 1993) (focusing on agency costs). For empirical studies
showing greater innovation among smaller firms and competitive markets, see generally PAUL
GEROSKI, MARKET DYNAMICS AND ENTRY (1991), which survey studies that show generally
higher innovation rates in smaller firms, albeit with some variation across industries; Zoltan J.
Acs & David B. Audretsch, Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 78
AMER. ECON. REV. 678 (1988), which examine data on innovations introduced to the market in
1982. But see JOHN BALDWIN ET AL., THE DETERMINANTS OF INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY IN CANADIAN
MANUFACTURING FIRMS: THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1-32 (Statistics Canada
Working Paper No. 122, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/deli-
very.taf?23765&_UserReference=A7FA65BC8A15900339F0927D, which found that firm size
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pensity has been identified in cultural industries as well as other
sectors. 54 Moreover, empirical studies, while not unequivocal, sup-
port the results one would expect under both the neoinstitutional
literature and the relaxed assumptions under the traditional model.
They suggest that a multiplicity of expressive outlets, combined
with the presence or threat of competition, is in fact more conducive
to expressive diversity than market concentration. 55
Finally, the theoretical literature positing that, under cer-
tain conditions, monopolists will create greater diversity than com-
petitors, fails to account for non-commercial speakers. Empirical
studies support the intuition that speakers, such as publicly-funded
broadcasters and minority-owned commercial broadcasters, whose
choice of speech at least in part reflects non-market commitments
and concerns, produce a higher proportion of minority-oriented pro-
gramming than more decidedly market-driven broadcasters.5 6 These
studies also support more general findings that most non-
correlates positively with innovation but that intermediate levels of competition are more closely
associated with innovation than are highly concentrated markets. Much of the neoinstitutional
literature seeks to refute Schumpeter's thesis that both market concentration and large firm size
correlate positively with R&D intensity. See JOSEPH A. ScHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 131-34 (5th ed. 1975). While that literature shows numerous instances in
which Schumpeter's thesis fails, Schumpeter's critics concede that they have not, and perhaps
cannot, establish "[an 'optimum' degree of competition, which holds across all industries and all
times, for promoting technical progress." See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra
note 12, at 176.
For an excellent survey of the literature in this area, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating
the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent Protection and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
54. See Paul DiMaggio, Market Structure, the Creative Process, and Popular Culture: To-
ward an Organizational Reinterpretation of Mass-Culture Theory, 11 J. POPULAR CULTURE 436,
440 (1977) (noting that larger, established media organizations have a poorer record than do
smaller, independent firms in providing innovative products).
55. See, e.g., August E. Grant, The Promise Fulfilled? An Empirical Analysis of Program
Diversity on Television, 7 J. MEDIA ECON. 51, 62 (1994) (presenting results of empirical study
supporting assumption that an increase in the number of television channels leads to an increase
in the number of program types offered); Robert P. Rogers & John R. Woodbury, Market Struc-
ture, Program Diversity, and Radio Audience Size, 16 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 81, 90 (1996)
(finding positive relationship between format diversity and number of stations, but finding that
program diversity effects will be substantial only if the increase in the number of additional
stations is very large); cf. STEVEN T. BERRY & JOEL WALDFOGEL, MERGERS, STATION ENTRY, AND
PROGRAMMING VARIETY IN RADIO BROADCASTING 18 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Work-
ing Paper No. W7080, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7080.pdf (finding that
concentrated media ownership in local radio station markets leads to a greater multiplicity of
programming in similar, but not identical formats because entities owning several stations in a
given broadcast market and facing the realistic threat of competition choose to locate in closely
related formats to avoid creating holes in the product space for new entrants).
56. See, e.g., Jeff Dubin & Matthew L. Spitzer, Testing Minority Preferences in Broadcast-
ing, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 866, 869, 872 (1995) (studying programming for racial minorities).
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commercial, government-subsidized stations fill programming
niches that commercial stations leave unserved.5 7 In sum, absent a
robust sector of non-commercial speakers, media markets, particu-
larly concentrated but also competitive, will likely produce a subop-
timal quantum of expressive diversity. 58
I do not mean to overstate this. Certainly, even an Internet
characterized by considerable ownership concentration would likely
produce an abundant menu of content choices for consumers. 59
Among other factors, the Internet's global reach enables the aggre-
gation of geographically dispersed minority preferences so as to
render commercially feasible media product differentiation tailored
to those preferences. 60 But even in a regime of narrowcasted con-
tent, a global Internet market characterized by considerable owner-
ship concentration and material barriers to entry may well tend to
homogenize minority content and exclude-or at least relegate to
the virtual street corner-expression designed for marginal audi-
ences.
61
Consider Time Warner's recent acquisition of Africana.com.
Africana.com is a web portal established by celebrated Harvard
University professors, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and Kwame Anthony
Appiah.62 Inspired by the work of W.E.B. Du Bois, the portal has a
distinctly (although not exclusively) Africanist perspective. It aims
to provide authoritative information and opinion regarding "Africa
and her Diaspora" in an entertaining manner and to build ties
among African and African Diaspora communities worldwide.
63
57. See Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Public Radio in the United States: Does it Correct
Market Failure or Cannibalize Commercial Stations? 71 J. PUB. ECON. 189, 208-09 (1999),
available in earlier format http://papers.nber.org/papersw6057.pdf.
58. See BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 101-50 (1992) (finding
that commercial speakers, particularly those who are advertiser supported, underserve minority
tastes); JOEL WALDFOGEL, PREFERENCE EXTERNALITIES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF WHO BENEFITS
WHOM IN DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKETS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 7391, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7391 (finding that majority
preferences tend to crowd out minority ones in markets, like media markets, characterized by
large fixed costs and preferences differing sharply across consumers).
59. See Lewis, supra note 42, at 36 (discussing narrowcasting and personal customization
possibilities of Web TV).
60. See WALDFOGEL, supra note 58, at 29-30.
61. Cf. OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 58, at 101-50 (noting that traditional media's con-
genital bias against minority tastes and in favor of large audiences' tastes is exacerbated in
media characterized by firm concentration and in media supported by advertising).
62. Professors Gates and Appiah founded the site to promote an encyclopedia they edited,
Africana. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 32, at C2.
63. Darrol G. Roberts, About Us: A Message from the President, available at http://www.afri-
cana.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2000) (describing Africana.com's mission statement in a click-
through link entitled "About Us").
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Unable to maintain the portal as a commercially viable inde-
pendent voice, Africana.com's founders have now sold it to Time
Warner.64 Now, Time Warner might continue to operate the portal
in line with the founder's original mission, as Professors Gates and
Appiah clearly hope.65 But it seems likely that the company will
seek to tailor portal content to suit the marketing priorities of Time
Warner affiliates. This would primarly involve the promotion of
Time Warner inventory. A company spokesman has told reporters
that Time Warner hopes to use the portal to exploit the company's
extensive library of film, television, and music of interest to Afri-
can-Americans. 66 Time Warner's marketing plan is likely also to
involve the elimination of some of the radically Africanist and anti-
status quo expression that currently appears (together with much
decidedly mainstream expression) on portal sites and discussion
fora. Indeed, Time Warner has gained some notoriety in the past for
discarding a lucrative gangsta rap record label and pressuring
popular rap artist Ice T to eliminate a controversial song from an
album, apparently out of a concern for its overall corporate image.6 7
If my conjecture is correct, then even within the context of
narrowcasting to a minority audience, Time Warner will blunt more
controversial, politically marginal expression. It will do so, moreo-
ver, for reasons of corporate synergy and overall marketing strat-
egy, not necessarily because the controversial speech it declines to
distribute lacks a viable audience.
C. Sum
Those who contend that speech hierarchy unduly stifles ex-
pressive diversity raise a serious and continuing concern. Afri-
cana.com's integration into Time Warner and the probable stifling
of the portal's independent voice will likely be typical of Internet
speech markets. Whatever the mix of exogenous consumer prefer-
ence-and one can assume that, almost by definition, politically
marginal expression would attract a small audience-the structure
of online and offline media markets raises significant entry barriers
for independent speakers like Africana.com's founders. The Internet
64. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 32, at C2.
65. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr. & Kwame Anthony Appiah, A Message from Our Founders
(last visited Oct. 23, 2000) (stating that 'Time Warner's resources will enable use to fulfill [our]
mission even more effectively and expeditiously"), available at http://www.afri-
cana.com/index_20000908.htm.
66. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 32, at C2.
67. See Joel Selvin, Warner Knuckles Under, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 1995, at C1.
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makes possible greater product differentiation than in offline me-
dia. But online as well as offline, narrowcasted commercial content
is tailored to maximize corporate synergies and skewed towards
audiences likely to buy content and advertiser's products. 68 Even
on the Internet, market forces propel speaker concentration, which
then tends towards the crowding out of minority views.
Of course, the notion of expressive diversity is quite elusive.
We have no way of measuring how much expressive diversity is
enough. Nor is it a simple matter to determine whether any given
mix of speech meets whatever standard for diversity we decide to
employ. Nevertheless, the apparent fact that speech hierarchy both
skews public debate and limits expressive diversity should at least
require that we consider the extent to which we are truly commit-
ted to fostering a broad-or broader-spectrum of opinion. It should
also dictate further investigation into whether alternative institu-
tions might yield greater expressive diversity (however defined)
than do online and offline media markets as currently structured.
III. COPYRIGHT FOSTERS SPEECH HIERARCHY
I will argue in this Part that copyright contributes to speech
hierarchy. It is widely recognized that copyright imposes allocative
costs. 69 But my point here is that the exclusive rights in original
expression that copyright law accords have a distributive, as well as
allocative effect. Copyright presents differential incentives and
burdens across our system of free expression. In so doing, it fosters
media centralization and fortifies the barriers to entry that face
independent speakers like Africana.com.
68. See WEBSTER & PHALEN, supra note 17, at 103 (noting that with unlimited channels, it
may be profitable to "produce minority content for relatively small segments of the audience,
particularly if those segments have characteristics appealing to advertisers" or if those audience
segments "are willing and able to pay for it").
69. Without some method by which an author can exclude unauthorized copying of gn ex-
pressive work, competition in copying and disseminating the work would drive the price for cop-
ies (and other forms of access) to their near-zero marginal cost. In order to provide an incentive
for the creation and dissemination of original expression, copyright enables authors (and their
assigns) to charge a supracompetive price, i.e., a price above marginal cost. In so doing, however,
copyright imposes a deadweight social loss; some consumers who value the copyright-protected
expression at more than its marginal cost but at less than its supracompetitive price, will not
acquire a copy (or some other form of access). See William W. Fisher I, Reconstructing the Fair
Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1701-03 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market
Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 869 (1992);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325 (1989); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 564 (1996).
2000] 1899
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
First, some fundamentals. All authorship builds upon pre-
existing expression. Authors-all of us who share our thoughts and
creative impulses through traditional media or over the Internet-
regularly borrow from existing art, literature, music, and film. At
the very least, our work reflects the information and inspiration we
draw from existing speech. Further, much of our expressive crea-
tion is populated with explicit references to the works of others. We
commonly excerpt, cite, translate, critique, comment upon, parody,
sequel, and otherwise creatively reformulate existing works. Our
nominally original works are actually "tissues of quotations."70 The
speech of our predecessors comprises our raw material; our refine-
ments nourish those that follow. 71
Yet copyright law accords providers of expressive content
with ever-expanding control over others' uses of that content, sig-
nificantly increasing the cost of reformulating or even gaining ac-
cess to existing expression. Throughout most of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the United States copyright acts provided for a narrowly tai-
lored exclusive right to make copies of an original work. Under that
regime, authors were free to borrow extensively from prior works in
creating their own,7 2 and in any event works entered the public do-
main at most forty-two years after they were first published.7 3 To-
day, however, copyright owners in the United States and elsewhere
enjoy a vastly broader set of prerogatives. These include the exclu-
70. ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 146 (Stephen Heath
trans., 1977).
71. Moreover, "speech," in both common parlance and the First Amendment sense, need not
involve "authorship," the creation of original expression. It is no less "speech" to convey verbatim
what someone else has created than to express oneself in one's own words. The Supreme Courts
iteration in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998), is
instructive: 'When a public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presen-
tation of its programming, it engages in speech activity .... Although programming decisions
often involve the compilation of the speech of third parties, the decisions nonetheless constitute
communicative acts." Id. See also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group,
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995) (a speaker need not "generate, as an original matter, each item
featured in the communication").
72. My favorite example is the mid-nineteenth century case, Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas.
201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514). In that action, the German translator of Uncle Tom's Cabin
defeated Harriet Beecher Stowe's copyright infringement action against him; the court held that
the translation was a new work and not merely a reproduction of the original. Id. at 207-08.
73. Under the first federal copyright statute, the Act of May 31, 1790, the term of copyright
protection was fourteen years, but copyright could be renewed for a second fourteen-year term if
the author was still living at the expiration of the first term. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1
Stat. 124, 124. In 1831, Congress doubled the original term. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1,
4 Stat. 436, 436. It then doubled the renewal term in 1909. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §
23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
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sive right to make derivative works, 74 even those that may bear
scant resemblance to the owner's preexisting work.75 Moreover,
given the current copyright term of the life of the author plus 70
years in both the United States and European Union, copyright
owner control commonly endures for more than a century before a
work enters the public domain.7 6 As a result, except for works of a
bygone age, much of the literature, art, film, and music that serves
as the wellspring for further creative expression is subject to copy-
right holders' proprietary control. 77
Digital technology has the effect of further constricting the
public domain by narrowing the scope of uses that were tradition-
ally outside the copyright owner's prerogative or enforcement
power. Outside the digital realm, readers are free to browse
through books and magazines at bookstores and libraries. Purchas-
ers are also free to read their books or listen to their CDs as many
74. The Copyright Act of 1976 accords authors the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works based upon any type of copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994). It defines "de-
rivative work" broadly to include "a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionali-
zation, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." Id. § 101. In addition,
under the "total concept and feel" and "fragmented literal similarity" tests, courts have broadly
construed the exclusive right to make copies to include defendants' works that bear only a loose
resemblance to, or only copy a very small portion of, the copyright owner's work. See Netanel,
supra note 21, at 302-03.
75. Several cases have involved either the derivative right or a very broad interpretation of
the reproduction right. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc., v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150
F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a multiple choice trivia quiz regarding the television
series, Seinfeld, infringes the copyright in the series episodes); Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789
F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a set of still photographs of a ballet may infringe the
copyright in an original choreographic work); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d
1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that defendanes imitative greeting card may be infringing
even though it copied neither copyrighted text nor copyrighted artwork).
76. On October 27, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the "Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act," Pub. L. No. 105-298, sec. 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998), which extends
the copyright term by an additional 20 years. The general term is now the life of the author plus
70 years, and the term for anonymous works, pseudonymous work, and works-for-hire is 95 years
from the year of the work's publication or 120 years from the year its creation, whichever expires
first. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994). In 1993, the European Union directed its member states to
enact copyright terms of the life of the author plus 70 years. See Council Directive 93/98, arts. 1,
7, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9.
77. Significant exceptions under United States copyright law include: (1) works that fell
into the public domain for publication without a copyright notice failure prior to March 1, 1989,
when Congress eliminated the notice requirement, see 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1994), (2) works pub-
lished before January 1, 1964, for which the copyright was not renewed for a second term, see
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.05[A] (1999), and (3) works
created by United States government employees within the scope of their employment," which
under section 105 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1994), are not subject to protection un-
der the Act.
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times as they like and to share those items with others to enjoy.78
Finally, individuals may freely copy magazine articles and music
recordings, and may modify or add notations to many types of
works, whether because the law permits such personal uses or be-
cause they are simply beyond the copyright owner's power to pre-
vent.
However, the move to digital storage and distribution of
many expressive works carries the potential for sharply constricting
such uses.79 For one, merely viewing or listening to a work on the
Internet may infringe the owner's copyright because such Internet
browsing involves the temporary replication of the work in the RAM
of the user's computer, which, recent cases suggest, might consti-
tute a potentially actionable reproduction of the work.80 While con-
tent providers often license and encourage such browsing, many
restrict or impose conditions on access, making judicial characteri-
zation of Internet browsing as reproduction a potentially important
tool for enforcing such restrictions both against individual users
and those who are deemed to have facilitated individuals' unau-
thorized access. At the same time, digital watermarking and other
encryption techniques give content providers unprecedented ability
to trace the source of unauthorized copies and to extract payment
even for single personal copies. Such "trusted systems" raise the
specter of content providers' hermetic control over each and every
use of original expression.8'
While market and technological conditions are not yet con-
ducive to such a draconian regime, recent legislation lays the
78. Under the first sale doctrine, one who purchases a copy of a copyright-protected work
may generally dispose of that copy as she wishes without running afoul of the copyright owner's
exclusive public distribution right. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
79. Of course, digital technology also creates possibilities for rampant easy, instantaneous,
unauthorized copying and worldwide distribution of perfect quality facsimiles of expressive
works, a phenomenon that, if left unchecked, would radically undermine copyright owner enti-
tlements.
80. See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d
1290, 1294-95 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that in making a RAM copy of infringing material while
browsing through the pages of a web site, "the person who browsed infringes the copyright," and
thus that one who encourages others to visit the web site is liable for contributory infringement);
see also MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
loading a computer operating system into RAM constitutes the making of an infringing copy).
But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1365-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that copying that is automatic and incidental to Internet op-
eration is not an actionable reproduction). For an illuminating discussion of the RAM-copy issue,
see R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right. The Copyright Act's Neglected Solution to the
Controversy Over RAM Copies, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
81. See Mark Gimbel, Note, Some Thoughts on the Implications of Trusted Systems for Intel-
lectual Property Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1679-80 (1998).
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groundwork for trusted systems' widespread deployment. The Digi-
tal Millenium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 8 2 which Congress enacted in
October 1998, prohibits both the circumvention of technology that
controls access to copyrighted works and the manufacture and sale
of devices that are primarily used to circumvent technological con-
trols over access to or uses of copyrighted works.8 3 Under the
DMCA, indeed, content providers may often effectively prevent cir-
cumvention even when the encrypted work is largely or entirely in
the public domain and even when the desired use would otherwise
be permitted under copyright law.84 Further, the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, 85 already enacted or under consid-
eration in a number of states, would validate mass market "click-
wrap" licenses, including provisions that impose access and use re-
strictions far exceeding those that content providers could other-
wise obtain under copyright law.86 The result will likely be de facto
perpetual protection and universal pay-for-access. 87
82. Digital Millenium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), Pub. L. No. 105-304, sec. 103, § 1201, 112
Stat. 2860, 2863-65 (1998).
83. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201(a)(1)(A), 1201(a)(2)(A), 1201(b)(1)(A) (West 2000) (banning circum-
vention of access controls, trafficking of devices for circumventing access controls, and trafficking
of devices for circumventing use controls).
84. Although the DMCA purports to protect the integrity only of technological measures
controlling access to and uses of works protected by copyright, its prohibitions would also encom-
pass works containing little copyrighted material (such as a Shakespeare play with a new intro-
duction) and public domain works subject to the same technological control measures as copy-
righted works (such as where public domain and copyrighted works are in the same data base).
The Act would also prohibit the trafficking of devices that enable users to make fair use of copy-
righted works. See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 727-32 (2000) (presenting case studies); see also Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Reimerdes, 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1873 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that distribution of soft-
ware enabling the circumvention of encryption designed to control access and copying of films
stored on DVDs contravenes the DMCA even if user copying would constitute fair use).
85. UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/ulc/ucita/ucita200.htm.
86. For critical analysis, see generally David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract
into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999).
87. See Nimmer, supra note 84, at 741 (contending that, under the right market conditions,
the DMCA will lead to "universal pay-per-use and de facto perpetual protection"). Digital tech-
nology makes possible the aggregation of access to expression, through the sale of site licenses
and subscriptions, no less than the disaggregation of such access, though micro-charges for each
use. Both are vehicles for producer appropriation of consumer surplus: disaggregation by differ-
ential pricing based on frequency and, possibly value of use, and aggregation by flattening differ-
ential demand through product or user bundling. Critics of the deployment of digital technology
to effectively expand copyright owner prerogatives generally raise the specter of pay-per-use.
But recent literature on the economics of digital information predicts, I think correctly, that
producers will more often deploy a no less expansionist strategy of product or user bundling,
through the sale of site licenses and subscriptions. See Yannis Bakos & Eric Brynjolfsson, Ag-
gregation and Disaggregation of Information Goods: Implications for Bundling, Site Licensing,
and Micropayment Systems, in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL
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Significantly, this copyright-centered enclosure of what was
once free use and public domain exacerbates speech hierarchy. 88 It
does so both statically and dynamically. First, copyright favors con-
glomerate copyright owners over those with an immediate need to
use existing copyright-protected speech in creating new expression.
In so doing, copyright erects barriers to would-be entrants into the
speech arena. Second, over time copyright favors those speakers
with substantial copyright portfolios over speakers who lack them.
This leads to ever-greater media concentration.
A. Copyright's Static Effect
Traditional media enterprises and, now, emerging telecom-
munications conglomerates amass vast inventories of copyright-
protected expression. Consequently, individuals, educational and
non-profit institutions, and independent publishers and producers
must increasingly obtain permission from those conglomerates in
order to access, use, and build upon existing expression. 89 In the
best of circumstances for prospective users, obtaining permission
simply involves payment: a transfer of consumer surplus from pro-
spective user to content provider. As I will discuss below, such
transfers may contribute dynamically to greater concentration in
speech arena, but from an immediate, static perspective, so long as
the prospective user actually makes use of the existing expression,
they do not directly implicate speech hierarchy. In many other
cases, however, would-be users cannot obtain permission for their
desired use. Rather they must eschew that use because of the pro-
hibitive cost of purchasing and negotiating for permission or be-
cause the provider flatly denies permission.90 The result in that
INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 114 (Brian Kahin & Hal R. Varian, eds., 2000)
[hereinafter INTERNET PUBLISHING]; Peter C. Fishburn et al., Fixed-Fee Versus Unit Pricing for
Information Goods: Competition, Equilibria, and Price Wars, in INTERNET PUBLISHING, supra, at
167, 168-73.
88. See generally Benkler, supra note 11.
89. See id. at 400-07; see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970) (presenting a prescient, early view that media enterprises' control
over a broad portfolio of expressive works may threaten First Amendment interests).
90. As Julie Cohen correctly observes, "there is no particular reason to believe that creative
ability will always correlate with ability to pay market price for improvement rights, or that
owners will be equally willing to license all types of improvements." Cohen, supra note 44, at
482 n.67. With regard to the former, it must be remembered that, given the widespread and
significant positive externalities attendant to the consumption and reformulation of expression,
secondary users are no more able to appropriate the full social value of their use than is the
creator of the work they seek to use. That is especially the case with regard to individuals and
non-commercial entities who lack financing, marketing networks, and distribution outlets, and
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event, with a possible qualification that I will discuss shortly, is an
immediate, differential chilling of speech. Copyright provides the
conglomerate content provider with a continuing incentive to build
upon its inventory to create new speech of the conglomerate's
choosing. But at the same time, a non-conglomerate user who might
have otherwise created new expression, or simply benefited from
gaining access to existing expression, has effectively been prevented
from doing so.91
This result, I wish to emphasize, transcends copyright's allo-
cative cost, the deadweight loss measured by the consumer and
producer surplus foregone because the sale of access or use of ex-
pression does not take place.92 Given- existing patterns of copyright
ownership, the ramifications of such foregone transactions are sys-
tematically distributive as well. Firms owning large inventories of
copyrighted expression are far more likely to be the unwilling or
monopoly-rent-seeking licensor. Others, including in particular
non-wealthy individuals, not-for-profit entities, and critics of the
licensor's expression, are far more likely to be the frustrated would-
be licensee.93 Effective speech almost always requires the use of
existing expression. Some speakers use existing expression for edi-
fication, inspiration, or raw material in creating expression.9 4 Some
who, indeed, might not wish to market their own expressive product. Cf. Diane Leenheer Zim-
merman, A Lesson for the Digital Future from the Old Media: Photocopying, Journal Pricing and
Their Impact on the Enterprise of Scholarship and Research n.36 (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ili/conferences/freeinfo2000/abstracts/zimmer-man.htm)
(Apr. 1, 2000) (citing data suggesting that dramatic increases in subscription prices for scholarly
journals distributed by commercial publishers have led academic institutions to forgo subscrip-
tions, eliminating researcher and student opportunities to browse through journal issues and
leading to considerable delays for those seeking to view particular articles).
91. Significantly, moreover, the express or anticipated threat of copyright infringement liti-
gation amplifies that differential chilling effect. Faced with such a threat, would-be users regu-
larly desist even from uses that might well be privileged or non-infringing. See Zimmerman,
supra note 90 (discussing chilling effect of threat of copyright infringement litigation on aca-
demic institutions).
92. See supra note 69.
93. One might assume that even non-wealthy prospective consumers who seek to use ex-
pression in socially valuable ways could finance their purchase of a copyright license. However,
even when the copyright owner is willing to license, secondary users are generally unable to
appropriate the full social value of their use, and thus often cannot rely on their prospective use
to finance purchase of a copyright license. See supra note 90.
94. Copyright law's idea/expression dichotomy is supposed to allow speakers to copy other's
ideas, and is thus traditionally viewed as a vehicle for ensuring that copyright does not impinge
upon free speech for First Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (stating that First Amendment protections are "em-
bodied in the Copyright Aces distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable
facts and ideas"). But effective speech often does involve the use of particular expression, in-
cluding building upon or simply copying someone else's original expression. See supra note 71.
Moreover, as copyrights scope expands, creative reformulations that were once deemed permis-
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effective speech simply involves selecting and conveying another's
original expression, whether because that expression perfectly re-
flects one's own ideas or because one wishes to expose a text one
finds repugnant or ridiculous. 95 Whatever the desired use, copy-
right accords media conglomerates a decided speech advantage and
imposes entry barriers upon prospective speakers who do not own
vast content portfolios.
Now for the possible qualification. The extent to which copy-
right exacerbates speech hierarchy by favoring owners over users
depends largely on the elasticity of consumer demand for particular
expressive works. If, as some commentators assert,96 expressive
works generally have close substitutes among other expressive
works of the same or similar genre, then prospective users faced
with content providers' unacceptable terms or refusal to permit the
requested use can simply select a different work. Put another way,
content providers' power in the market for a given work is largely a
function of the uniqueness versus substitutability of the work for
prospective users.97 To the extent works are substitutable and con-
sumer demand for any given work elastic, content providers, like
electric appliance salesmen, will compete to offer their product on
terms that are favorable to potential users.
Of course, copyright law is built on what appears to be a cor-
rect assumption that copyright does, in fact, create a degree of
market power. At best, content providers engage in monopolistic
sible appropriations of idea are now commonly found to be infringing on copyrighted expression.
Netanel, supra note 21, 301-04.
95. See supra note 71. The in toto replication of another's copyrighted expression for pur-
poses of criticism has sometimes been held to be fair use, see, e.g., Belmore v. City Pages Inc., 34
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1294 (D. Minn. 1995) (newspaper's replication of a racist fable appearing in a
police department newsletter), and sometimes not, see, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 40
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1569 (E.D. Va. 1996) (Church of Scientology suit to prevent critic from posting
Church documents on the Internet). I am not aware of any case in which replication for purposes
of expressing one's own belief in the copied material has been held to be a fair use. See World-
wide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., No. 99-55850, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
23390 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2000) (holding that the fair use privilege did not apply to a church off-
shoot, which copied and distributed, for the religious observance of its members, a text, written
by the now-deceased principal church founder, that the principal church leaders had determined
was inconsistent with church doctrine).
96. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use. The Impact of Automated Rights Man-
agement on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 588-89, 601-08 (1998); Maureen
A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 81-90 (1997).
97. Content providers' market power will also depend on consumers' elasticity of demand for
expressive products generally. To the extent that activities and goods other than the experienc-
ing of expressive products are substitutable for a given consumer, then the providers of expres-
sive goods will have less power to dictate the terms of access to them.
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competition between similar, but not identical, copyright-protected
expression. That competition cannot drive down the price for access
and use of copyrighted works to their fully competitive, near-zero
marginal cost without destroying the copyright incentive to create
and make such works available in the first place. 98 Nevertheless, a
disciplined market of readily substitutable expressive goods would
reduce (but not eliminate) a copyright owner's power in the market
for any particular work. And in so doing, it might sharply curtail
(but, again not eliminate) copyright's potentially chilling effect on
the speech of those who must obtain conglomerate permission to
use copyrighted works.
The extent of substitutability of expressive goods and, in-
deed, the elasticity of consumer demand for such goods in general
remain open questions. 99 One would expect that empirical investi-
gation would yield varying results across different categories of ex-
pression and different consumers. Nevertheless, a number of factors
suggest that many expressive works-including most popular nov-
els, newspapers, songs, movies, and television programs, as well as
many scholarly publications-are generally less substitutable than
toasters, toothbrushes, and other such consumer goods. To the ex-
tent this is in fact the case, content providers may enjoy consider-
able power in the market for expression.
First among these factors, informational and cultural works
share characteristics of "solidarity" and "associative goods." "Soli-
darity goods," like the President's State of the Union Address or a
popular movie, have value for the individual viewer largely because
they are consumed by many people. 100 "Associative goods," like
country clubs and institutions of higher education, have value for
the individual consumer largely because they are also consumed by
a certain select category of other people. 10 In either event, part of
98. See supra note 69; cf. Johannes Ludwig, The Essential Economic Problem of the Media:
Working Between Market Failure and Cross-Financing, 13(3) J. MEDIA ECON. 187, 188-89 (2000)
(noting that media firms not only could not recover their fixed costs through marginal cost pric-
ing but indeed must often find additional revenue, such as advertising, to make up the difference
between fixed costs and actual net sales revenue).
99. For illuminating efforts to grapple with this issue, see Cohen, supra note 44, at 520-21;
Fisher, supra note 69, at 1700-03.
100. Cass Sunstein and Edna Ullman-Margalit label as "solidarity goods" those "goods whose
value increases as the number of people enjoying them increases." CASS R. SUNSTEIN & EDNA
ULLMAN-MARGALIT, SOLIDARITY IN CONSUMPTION 1 (University of Chicago John M. Olin Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 98 (2d Series), 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.-
com/sol3/delivery.taf?2983&_UserReference=6706C6CE3207B7B939D23ACA.
101. See HENRY HANsMANN, HIGHER EDUCATION AS AN ASSOCIATIVE GOOD (Yale Inl Ctr. for
Fin. Working Paper No. 99-13, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/deliv-
ery.taf?23624&_UserReference=A7FA65BC8A15900339F0927D.
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what consumers are willing to pay for, when they buy solidarity or
associative goods, are the benefits they glean from the fact that
other people-or certain other people-are also enjoying the same
good.10 2 Such goods thus have value far greater than each individ-
uars personal benefit from consuming the good. To the extent that
a given product has solidarity or associative value, a second product
that few others-or few others of a particular group-are consum-
ing would be an inadequate substitute for the first even if the two
products are quite similar to each other.
Newspapers, movies, books, songs, and television shows that
are read, watched, and listened to by many people in a particular
social group are classic solidarity and associative goods. We do not
read a newspaper or book, watch a movie or television show, or
even listen to a song merely because of the solitary, personal bene-
fit and enjoyment it gives us. Rather, we generally want to read,
see, and hear at least in part what we think others of our social
group are reading, seeing, and hearing. We want to experience cul-
tural events and phenomena jointly with others and to share a
common basis for conversation with our friends and colleagues. We
also want to know what others think is important, current, and of
interest, and to show others in our social group that we also are "in
the know." As a result, our demand for popular, opinion-leading, or
prestigious expression is likely to be considerably less elastic, and
other expressive works-even those that otherwise impart much the
same information and enjoyment-considerably less substitutable,
than is the case with consumer goods that merely provide more
atomistic, solitary benefits.
Significantly, moreover, the solidarity or associative charac-
ter of certain expressive works may be as strong or stronger for
authors-those who wish to refer to, critique, learn from, or refor-
mulate existing expression in creating their own-than it is for
those whose use is more passively consumptive. Critics and com-
mentators of cultural expression, authors of scientific and scholarly
publications, and many novelists, filmmakers, and artists must be
conversant in the relevant art and literature if they are to commu-
nicate effectively to their audience. Existing works of authorship
comprise and contain a significant part of the language, under-
standings, standards, and norms of social and professional
102. SUNSTEIN & MARGALIT, supra note 100, at 3.
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groups. 10 3 Without access and the ability to borrow from and refer
to key representative works, authors can neither participate in the
joint conversation that defines their social or professional group
nor, in some cases, successfully engage a mass audience.
A second factor diminishing the availability of substitute ex-
pression is content provider integration. In concentrated media
markets, those who wish to buy the right to use existing content for
the purpose of creating new expression will likely have to deal with
one of a few media conglomerates. Even absent oligopolistic con-
straints on competition, such content providers are likely to share a
fundamental conservatism in licensing transformative or competing
uses of items in their respective inventories. 10 4 Media conglomer-
ates are in the business of managing, not selling off, their content
portfolios. Their goal is to build upon existing inventory, exploit
synergies with corporate partners, and selectively license content in
ways that will maximize the value of the inventory as a whole. Me-
dia conglomerates accordingly have a strong incentive to avoid con-
troversial reformulations of their content that might (1) subvert
that content's carefully cultivated conventional meaning, (2) di-
minish its commercial value or the value of other inventory items,
or (3) potentially compete with planned uses of that or other con-
tent by conglomerate divisions and corporate partners. 105 Far from
licensing controversial or competing uses of their inventory, media
enterprises thus aggressively seek to stifle such uses. 106
103. See Zimmerman, supra note 90 (discussing professional need of researchers and aca-
demics to be conversant in the scholarly literature of their field).
104. Cf. Hal R. Varian, Market Structure in the Network Age (unpublished paper, available
at http://www.sims.berke-ley.edu/-hallPapers/doc/doc.pdf) (August 30, 1999) (surveying studies
showing that firms often match the prices of dominant firms rather than seeking to undercut
them, especially when those firms are able to discover or anticipate competitors' price increases
before consumers).
105. Media conglomerate conservatism parallels dominant firm reluctance to undertake re-
search and development projects or commercialize innovations when doing so might cannibalize
the firm's existing revenue streams. See MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTz, MARKET
STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION 110 (1982) (noting reluctance of firm managers to pursue innova-
tion that conflicts with existing product revenues); Barnett, supra note 53 (discussing large firm
reluctance to engage in research and development that might cannibalize existing products).
106. See, e.g., Doreen Carvajal, What Is a Book Publisher to Do When a Parody Hits Home?,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at DI (reporting that Crown Publishers cancelled its contract to pub-
lish a book that spoofed the works of another, more popular author, also published by Crown); see
also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (action by music publisher to enjoin
rap parody of song in its repertoire after refusing to license parody); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (action brought by Disney to enjoin parody of Disney char-
acters in counterculture comic book); cf. Jon M. Garon, Media and Monopoly in the Information
Age Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491,
590-91 (1999) (describing HarperCollins' breach of its agreement to publish the memoirs of Chris
Patten, the last British Governor of Hong Kong, under instruction from Rupert Murdoch, the
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Significantly, given media conglomerates' common conserva-
tism, prospective speakers seeking to reformulate popular expres-
sion in controversial ways are unlikely to find substitutes when de-
nied a license by any given content owner. Consider the often-cited
copyright infringement case, Walt Disney Producers v. Air
Pirates.10 7 There, the creators of a counterculture comic book sought
to contest Disney's all-American " 'world of scrubbed faces, bright
smiles and happy endings'" by depicting Mickey Mouse engaged in
various illicit activities. 10 8 That effort at social critique was stifled,
however, when Disney obtained a court order enjoining publication.
There are, of course, many ways to challenge romanticized imagin-
ings of American life. But the humorous denigration of a cultural
icon that immediately brings those imaginings to mind may be a
particularly potent way to do so. And in that regard, it is highly
unlikely that, having been thwarted by Disney, the comic book
creators could have obtained a license from Time Warner or another
Disney competitor to use any of those entities' proverbial characters
in a similar manner for a similar purpose.
In sum, an expanded copyright, together with concentrated
media markets, accords content providers with nontrivial market
power over expression. 10 9 Significantly, moreover, that market
controlling shareholder of HarperCollins' corporate parent, who was concerned about the mem-
oirs' impact on his media interests in China).
107. Walt Disney, 581 F.2d 751.
108. See id. at 753.
109. In addition to the solidarity good characteristics of many expressive works and the in-
creasing concentration of media markets, the ability to charge for the use rather than the sale of
hard copies, greatly enhanced by digital technology and backed by the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act, might also increase copyright owners' market power. As Ronald Coase conjectured,
monopolists selling durable goods face reduced market power. See Ronald Coase, Durability and
Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON. 143 (1972); see also John Shepard Wiley Jr. et al., The Leasing Mo-
nopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693 (1990) (analyzing the Coase Conjecture and surveying literature
that applies it). The reason is that high-valuation consumers, who might otherwise pay the
seller's monopoly price, know that the seller will be unlikely to maintain that price. They know
that once the seller clears the market of high-valuation consumers, he would then face the temp-
tation to drop the price in order to sell to low-valuation consumers. Anticipating this price re-
duction, high-valuation consumers will not buy at the initial high price, thus denying the seller
his monopoly profit. But if the monopolist leases the good instead of selling it, the high-
valuation consumers remain in the market and the monopolist has no incentive to lower the
future rental charge. Since high-valuation consumers now have no reason to expect a future
price decrease, they will be willing to pay the high-rental charges immediately, thereby enabling
the seller to earn a supracompetitive profit. A similar phenomenon might be expected to occur
when a provider of expressive content "leases" access to content rather than selling hard copies.
It is unclear, however, whether such "leasing" enhances content provider ability to extract con-
sumer surplus over and above the price that the provider can obtain through price discrimina-
tion and bundling, which digital technology also renders more effective than in the pre-digital
world. I thank Michael Meurer for raising and discussing this point with me.
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power may often burden speakers' ability effectively to express
ideas. Air Pirates is only one of numerous instances in which courts
have enjoined the use of copyrighted expression despite a colorable
argument that defendants, ranging from church dissidents and me-
dia critics to computer hackers and TV quiz book authors, 110 have
sought to use plaintiffs expression in order to effectively convey an
idea. And reported cases, no doubt, represent a mere fraction of in-
stances in which defendants and those threatened with suit have
refrained from expressing themselves in order to avoid the threat of
copyright infringement liability."'
Now that burden on speech might be a price we are willing to
pay for copyright's benefits for our system of free expression, some
of which I will discuss below. But in assessing copyright policy, we
must give due weight to copyright's free speech burdens. And, more
to the point here, we must consider whether copyright's differential
free speech burdens-the extent to which those who, lacking vast
inventories of copyrighted expression, enjoy lesser ability to use
existing expression in conveying their ideas than do large media
and telecommunications firms-might conflict with the Free Speech
Principle.
B. Copyright's Dynamic Effect
Copyright's differential static effect arises from occasions in
which users are unable or unwilling to license conglomerate-owned
expression. As Yochai Benkler has convincingly demonstrated, to-
day's expansive copyright also has a dynamic effect on media enter-
prise consolidation, which arises even when users are able and
110. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc., v. Carol Pubrg Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that a multiple choice trivia quiz regarding the television series, Seinfeld, in-
fringes the copyright in the series episodes); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 55
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1873 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (defendants enjoined from posting software containing
"expressive elements" and from posting links to other web sites containing the software); Los
Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (injunction against
right-wing critics of the mass media who sought to post copies of newspaper articles on a web site
in order to criticize the media's coverage of current events); Intellectual Reserve Inc. v. Utah
Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999) (preliminary injunction forbidding
defendant web site operator from posting the addresses of other web sites containing plaintiffs
copyrighted Church Handbook of Instructions); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1569 (E.D. Va. 1996) (Church of Scientology suit to prevent critics from posting Church
documents on the Internet).
111. See supra note 87; see also Jean 0. Lanjuow & Josh Lerner, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6296, 1997) (stating that litigation costs fall most heavily on
small firms, who may choose to settle because they cannot afford long-term litigation).
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willing to license expression." 2 Since all speech incorporates inputs,
learning, or inspiration from prior speech, those who own exclusive
rights in vast inventories of expression enjoy economic advantages
over those who do not. In creating new expression, media conglom-
erates can use their existing inventories at their negligible mar-
ginal cost. Non-conglomerates, including individuals, educational
institutions, non-commercial media, and independent publishers,
must generally pay the copyright-buttressed supracompetitive price
for existing expressive inputs to their new expression. The more
non-conglomerates must pay for such expressive inputs, the more
costly is their expressive activity relative to that of media conglom-
erates. With an expanded copyright, therefore, conglomerate ex-
pression will increasingly dominate over non-conglomerate. Over
time, indeed, one would expect that speakers and expressive activ-
ity will move from the non-conglomerate sector to the conglomerate,
further spurring media concentration. 113
Significantly, moreover, today's expansive copyright, coupled
with technological and contractual control measures, amplifies this
dynamic effect by enabling large firms to capture a significantly
greater portion of consumer surplus from the marketing of expres-
sive products than can individuals and firms with lesser resources
and smaller content inventories. Digital technology and control
measures enable firms to capture consumer surplus in two ways.
First, they make possible increasingly comprehensive and effective
price discrimination." 4 Second, they create new opportunities for
product and audience aggregation, or "bundling."
Even predigital copyright promotes a degree of price dis-
crimination." 5 It enables copyright owners to release works in dif-
ferent market segments at different times (for example, films re-
leased first in movie theaters, then airplanes and hotels, then video
rental and sale, then pay television, cable, and, eventually, free
television broadcast) and to release different versions of a work
(novel, translation, dramatization, motion picture version) at prices
that, at least in part, reflect heterogeneous consumer demand
112. See generally Benkler, supra note 11, at 401-08.
113. See generally id. at 407-08.
114. See generally Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use, and Piracy: Copy-
right Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845 (1997).
115. As Wendy Gordon astutely points out, indeed, copyright itself can be seen as a mecha-
nism for price discrimination between consumers who want to use a copy only for their personal
use and consumers (like publishers) who want to make and distribute further copies. See Wendy
J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1367, 1371-72 (1998).
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rather than the costs associated with product differentiation. 116 Yet,
digital delivery of content greatly enhances possibilities for effective
price discrimination. With digital technology, copyright owners can
refine and narrow market segments. They can charge different
prices for downloading a work, for downloading specified portions of
the work, or for access without downloading. With digital enforce-
ment and licensing, they can also charge differentially for a menu of
individual uses, ranging from use of the entire work in an educa-
tional or commercial setting to quoting from the work in criticism.
In so doing, moreover, copyright providers can finely tune pricing
by gathering significant information about consumer buying habits,
enabling an individualized assessment of preference and preference
intensity.117 Finally, digital trusted systems and encryption aug-
ment price discrimination capability by making it possible to pre-
vent buyer arbitrage, the purchase of an expressive good at a low
cost for resale, in competition with the copyright owner, to a.high-
valuing purchaser.
While price discrimination captures consumer surplus by dif-
ferential pricing tailored to hetereogeneous consumer demand, ag-
gregation accomplishes that result by effectively homogenizing con-
sumer demand through product or user bundling."8 The most sali-
ent examples of such aggregation in the digital network arena are
site licenses (which aggregate users) and data base subscriptions
(which aggregate products over time). By bundling large numbers of
users or products (or both), they effectively reduce consumer het-
erogeneity so that a single price fits all consumers. 119 Alternatively,
116. The determination of when price differentiation constitutes price discrimination can be
quite complex. See id. at 1376-78 (underscoring complexity with respect to copyright). Very
basically, price discrimination occurs in two principal instances: first, where the seller sells the
same good to two or more buyers at different net prices, and second, where the seller sells two
varieties of a good to two or more buyers at different net prices, the net price being the price paid
by the buyer corrected for the cost associated with the product differentiation. See Louis PHUPS,
THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 5-7 (1983).
117. For a brief discussion of providers' capability for gathering information about Internet
users' buying habits and preferences, and the privacy issues that capability raises, see Netanel,
supra note 29, at 473-80.
118. See generally Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 87. The aggregation effect reflects the
law of large numbers; as more and more goods are added to a bundle, the sum of consumer
valuations for the bundled goods becomes more concentrated around the mean, thus flattening
the demand curve. See id. at 120-21. Aggregation might be thought of as a type of price dis-
crimination, since it enables sellers to set a single price that efficiently allocates goods to con-
sumers. See id. at 121. But I use the term "price discrimination" in the more conventional and
narrow sense of differential pricing for the same or similar good.
119. See id. at 129-32; see also CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A
STRATEGIC GUIDE To THE NETWORK ECONOMY 73-78 (1999) (noting that by bundling various
expressive goods in a single package instead of selling each individually, sellers can enhance
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the content provider might combine price discrimination and bun-
dling strategies by offering a menu of different bundles at prices
that correlate with various flattened subsets of consumer demand.
It is uncertain-and a matter of considerable controversy-
whether these strategies will actually benefit consumers of expres-
sive goods. 120 Moreover, to the extent price discrimination and bun-
dling increase the cost of gaining access to or using expression that
would otherwise have been available for free or (in the case of bun-
dling) a lower cost, they heighten the static distributive effects dis-
cussed above. 12' But the point I want to make here centers on the
strategies' likely dynamic distributive impact among speakers.
Effective price discrimination, especially individualized
marketing of the sort anticipated by digital technology, will often
require a considerable investment. 22 Content providers seeking to
engage in such price discrimination will need to gather or buy in-
formation about potential consumers and to process and apply that
information in product marketing. 23 They must also be able to meet
highly varied demands for different forms of expression, access, and
use, to offer product lines containing various versions of product,
profit since consumer valuations for the right package of goods may be greater than the aggre-
gate of consumer valuations for each good individually); Yannis Bakos et al., Shared Information
Goods, J.L. & ECON. 117 (1999) (noting that pricing goods with the knowledge that they will be
shared informally may have some of the same profit enhancing benefits as more formal con-
sumer aggregation).
120. Most critics, including a number of contributors to this Symposium, focus on price dis-
crimination. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic
Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000);
Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); Gordon, supra note
115, at 1381-84; Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted
Systems, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL
RAMIFICATIONS (Neil Netanel et al. eds., forthcoming 2001). It seems, more likely, however, that
bundling or mixed bundlinglprice discrimination strategies will dominate digital markets. See
Fishburn et al., supra note 87, at 168-73 (discussing consumer preference for flat-rate pricing).
121. As a number of commentators have noted, while price discrimination is sometimes
touted as a means to provide universal access to expression, it may be that certain secondary
uses of copyrighted expression would be available just as widely and without any harm to the
copyright incentive if the copyright quasi-monopoly were not extended to encompass them. See,
e.g., Benkler, supra note 120; Cohen, supra note 120; Gordon, supra note 115, at 1381-84; Wein-
berg, supra note 120.
122. See Benkler, supra note 120 (contending that information and implementation costs will
always leave price discrimination imperfect).
123. See Weinberg, supra note 120 (noting that "[t]o the extent that sellers' ability to price
discriminate will rest on their access to personally identifiable information about buyers, pub-
lishers with access to those databases will have a competitive advantage over those who do not").
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assessing consumer sorting costs as they do so. 124 Finally, they will
reap significant advantages from economies of scale and a large
customer base that includes customers of varied preferences and
preference intensities. 125
Similarly, the use of product and consumer aggregation will
generally maximize the seller's appropriation of consumer surplus
only when the seller is able to aggregate a very large number of
products or consumers. 126 Firms with extensive content inventories
and an established customer base will thus be able to exploit this
profit-enhancing advantage to a far greater extent than small firms
and individuals. As commentators have noted, moreover, in the
presence of fixed production costs and minimal marginal costs of
reproduction and dissemination-as is the case with expressive
goods transmitted over the Internet-large scale bundling can pro-
vide significant competitive advantages. 127 Indeed, aggregation can
keep or drive competitors out of the market, even when their non-
bundled goods are superior and are produced with lower fixed
costs.
12 8
At bottom, then, price discrimination and bundling may pre-
sent yet another factor in tipping the content market towards a
handful of large players. Media enterprises with the resources ef-
fectively to engage in those strategies will attract larger audiences
and will glean a greater share of consumer surplus from their audi-
ences than will those without such resources. To the extent that an
expansive copyright and ownership of a vast and varied content
portfolio enhance possibilities for price discrimination and bun-
dling, they will favor wealthy speakers over others, further propel-
ling media concentration.
C. Partial Caveat
As we have seen, copyright has a dual distributive conse-
quence. It promotes speech hierarchy in the static sense by erecting
124. By bundling various expressive goods in a single package instead of selling each indi-
vidually, sellers can enhance profit since consumer valuations for the right package of goods may
be greater than the aggregate of consumer valuations for each good individually. See SHAPIRO &
VARIAN, supra note 119, at 73-78; Yannis Bakos et al., supra note 119, at 124-25.
125. See C. Edwin Baker, International Trade in Media Products, in THE COMMODIFICATION
OF INFORMATION, supra note 120 (discussing advantages of economies of scale in price discrimi-
nation in the context of international trade in expressive goods).
126. See Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 87, at 132.
127. See Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling and Competition on the Internet (Apr.
1999), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/-bakos (last visited Oct. 2, 2000).
128. See id. at 17-20.
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entry barriers before prospective speakers and in a dynamic sense
by fueling media concentration. At the same time, however, there is
one way in which copyright might ameliorate the worst diversity-
stifling effects of media concentration. As I have argued elsewhere,
some level of copyright protection might actually allow for greater
expressive diversity than might otherwise be possible under condi-
tions of media conglomeration.1 29 Copyright serves as a vehicle for
media conglomerates to outsource expressive production to inde-
pendent entities rather than integrating authors within the firm.
Statutorily defined and readily enforceable copyright holder rights
lower transaction costs and reduce the risks involved in acquiring
expressive products from unrelated firms and personnel 30 Copy-
right thus enhances possibilities for contract-based alliances and
producer networks, as opposed to vertical integration and intra-
firm organization. 131 Significantly in that regard, studies suggest
that, on the margins, large firms that acquire rights to expression
from a variety of independent producers exhibit a greater propen-
sity to expressive diversity than those that produce expression en-
tirely within the firm's internal organizational structures. 132
In short, absent copyright, media conglomerates might con-
centrate content production within integrated subsidiaries. To the
extent copyright facilitates more open, network production, it ap-
pears to have a diversity-enhancing effect that, to some degree,
mitigates copyright's overall diversity-diminishing force.
D. Sum
Copyright acts as an "engine of free expression" in the broad
sense that it provides a monetary inducement for the creation and
dissemination of new speech. 133 But neither that inducement nor
the levy copyright imposes on prospective users of existing expres-
129. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global
Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 218, 271 (1998).
130. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange A
Review Essay, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 1570, 1573-74 (1995).
131. For a parallel argument that both patent protection and the imposition of limitations to
patent holder rights assist in the formation of biotechnology research networks comprising a
dominant large firm and numerous small research firms, see Barnett, supra note 53.
132. See ROBERT BuRNETr, THE GLOBAL JUKEBOX: THE INTERNATIONAL Music INDUSTRY
115-16 (1996) (noting that large cultural industries using an open system of production and
development may show significant expressive diversity despite ownership concentration); Paul
D. Lopes, Innovation and Diversity in the Popular Music Industry, 1969 to 1990, 57 AM. SOC.
REV. 56, 60-70 (1992) (similar finding with regard to music industry).
133. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (labeling
copyright the "engine of free expression").
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sion is equally distributed. Rather, conglomerate content providers
reap the lion's share of the copyright benefit and others bear most
of the copyright burden. Copyright thus leads to more works being
created by conglomerates and fewer works being created by others
than might otherwise be the case. Seen in that light, by thus pro-
moting speech hierarchy, copyright acts sharply to the detriment of
the Free Speech Principle of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
debate from diverse and antagonistic sources.
That is not to say that copyright ought to be jettisoned, even
if the Free Speech Principle were the sole criteria for measuring
copyright's worth. It may well be, indeed, that on the whole, copy-
right better serves the Free Speech Principle than would other
plausible alternatives, such as a regime of no legal protection
against unauthorized copying of original expression or one in which
authorship depends heavily on government subsidy. 3 4 Neverthe-
less, copyright's apparent promotion of speech hierarchy ought to
place a heavy burden of persuasion on those who would justify
strengthening and expanding copyright owner rights on the basis of
copyright's purported compatibility with or furtherance of expres-
sive diversity.
IV. THE FREE PRESS PRINCIPLE
I have argued thus far that, in conjunction with other gov-
ernment media-related policies, copyright supports speech hierar-
chy and that, to the extent this is the case, copyright acts inconsis-
tently with the Free Speech Principle. I will now contend that, de-
spite this inconsistency, copyright's support of at least some market
hierarchy in speech may well comport with-and indeed be highly
conducive to-liberal democracy.
The critique of market hierarchy in speech rises from a
broad spectrum of liberal democratic thought. 135 Liberal critics con-
cerned with personal autonomy see the disproportionate power of
the commercial mass media as an obstacle to individuals' control
over their communication environment-individuals' ability to
choose to whom and with whom they communicate, to determine
134. For an interesting proposal that would give authors the option of choosing between
copyright and a government grant, see STEVEN SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, REWARDS
VERSUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 6956, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6956.pdf.
135. As Jonathan Weinberg points out, however, traditional First Amendment doctrine dis-
penses with the tension between speech hierarchy and the Free Speech principle by bracketing
off speech hierarchy, treating the "marketplace of ideas" as if it were a private conversation,
untinged by inequality in expressive resources. Weinberg, supra note 10, at 1142-43.
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their mode of expression, and to have access to a broad spectrum of
information sources.13 6 Critics concerned with democratic pluralism
deride market hierarchy's deleterious impact on the exchange of
opinion from a multiplicity of sources. 13 7 Habermasian "liberal re-
publicans" 138 lament the transformation of the early liberal public
sphere from a realm of politically autonomous and equal discuss-
ants to one of mass media distortion and stifling of minority
voices. 3 9 Democratic process theorists worry about speech hierar-
chy's corrosive effect on democratic institutions.140 Finally, with
greater optimism and considerable self-satisfaction, Internet liber-
tarians revel in what they perceive to be the death knell of institu-
tional mass media at the hands of a swelling multitude of individ-
ual web site operators and virtual discussion groups.' 4 '
This critique, in all its variant forms, cogently underscores
the sharp tension between speech hierarchy and the Free Speech
Principle. Contrary to what some commentators seem to suggest, 42
136. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 36, at 387-88 (noting that privately owned broadcast infra-
structures tend to "homogenize and standardize" information for mass public appeal).
137. See Baker, supra note 14, at 395-96 (noting that "something like equal expenditures
supporting each perspective" would best promote cultural pluralism, but concluding that a strict
equal expenditure regime would likely be unfair and unworkable); Fiss, supra note 10, at 1406-
13 (arguing that, under conditions of vast inequality of wealth, rigid adherence to a speaker
autonomy model of free speech jurisprudence will perpetuate disparate power of the wealthy in
public discourse and will effectively stifle robust debate from a multiplicity of sources).
138. I borrow the phrase "liberal republicans" from Ed Baker's enlightening comparison of
"liberal republican" versus "republican liberar' thought, focusing on the former's emphasis on
prepolitical individual autonomy and the latter's stress on democratic process and participation
as the guarantor of individual rights. C. Edwin Baker, Republican Liberalism: Liberal Rights
and Republican Politics, 41 FLA. L. REV. 491, 504-07 (1989).
139. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5; Baker, supra note 13, at 395 (summarizing republican con-
ception of media equality); Frank Michehnan, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1500-06 (1988).
See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SoCIETY (1989). For an illuminating analysis of
Habermas' move from Marxian critical theory to a position well within the parameters of liberal
democratic thought, see William E. Forbath, Habermas's Constitution: A History, Guide, and
Critique, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 969 (1998) (reviewing JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans.,
1996)).
140. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Media Concentration and Democracy: Commentary, 1999 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 277, 279-80 (stressing that media concentration poses a danger for democracy).
141. See SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 187-97 (describing the Internet libertarian position
without agreeing with it).
142. See, e.g., BRIAN MARTIN, INFORMATION LIBERATION: CHALLENGING THE CORRUPTIONS OF
INFORMATION POWER, ch. 3 (1998) CAgainst Intellectual Property"), extracts available at
www.danny.oz.au/free-software/advocacy/againstIP.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2000); Yochai
Benkler, A Speakers' Corner Under the Sun, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, supra
note 120; see also Nicholas Garnham, The Media and the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND THE
PUBLIC SPHERE 359, 367-68 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992) (criticizing postmodernist emphasis on
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however, one need not and ought not conclude that a wholly non-
hierarchical, decentralized expressive arena would better serve lib-
eral democratic values and governance. The reason is straightfor-
ward: Even assuming that a wholly non-hierarchical arena would in
fact yield greater expressive diversity, the Free Speech Principle
does not constitute the sole pillar of liberal democratic public dis-
course. No less than expressive diversity, liberal democracy rests
upon the Free Press Principle. 143 It requires an institutional media
that possesses the financial strength to reach a mass audience and
engage in sustained investigative reporting, free from a potentially
corrupting dependence on state subsidy. 14 In contrast to the Free
Speech Principle, therefore, the Free Press Principle necessarily
entails a degree of market hierarchy. Its realization envisions not a
two-dimensional expressive universe composed entirely of yeomen
speakers, but rather a speech realm comprising varied bubbles of
wealth and power.145 It requires that certain expressive enterprises
must have sufficient resources to reflect and galvanize public opin-
ion and to stand up to, hold accountable, and effectively chasten
powerful governmental and non-governmental entities.
Individual authors and web site operators lack the resources
to fulfill the press' traditional, vital role of watchdog against gov-
ernment myopia and oppression. Nor can individuals adequately
expose corporate unlawfulness, labor union corruption, and political
party self-aggrandizement. Liberal democratic nations necessarily
encompass multiple concentrations of power.146 Only an equally
proliferation of interpersonal electronic communication as desirable move away for mass com-
munication).
143. For a discussion of the distinction between the role and import of the free speech clause
versus the free press clause of the First Amendment, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 225-49 (1989); Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-
34 (1975). Regarding the central importance of a free press for democratic states generally, see
Pnina Lahav, An Outline for a General Theory of Press Law in Democracy, in PRESS LAW IN
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 339 (Pnina Lahav ed., 1985).
144. See DAVID L. PROTESS ET AL., THE JOURNALISM OF OUTRAGE: INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING
AND AGENDA BUILDING IN AMERICA 233-35 (1991) (describing significant investment of news
organizations' resources involved in investigative reporting and in responding to counterattacks
by government officials and private firms who are subjects of exposds). On the potential for state
interference attendant to state subsidy, see infra note 172.
145. But see Benkler, supra note 11, at 400 (criticizing expanded copyright on the grounds
that it "tends to produce market-based hierarchy, rather than to facilitate and sustain independ-
ent yeoman authors").
146. See PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 204-
50 (2000); see also Mark P. Petracca, The Future of an Interest Group Society, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERESTS: INTEREST GROUPS TRANSFORMED 345 (Mark P. Petracca ed., 1992) [hereinafter
POLITICS OF INTERESTS] (noting the continuing, vital role played by interest groups in the demo-
cratic process).
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powerful press-not just the daily press, but also a full array of
publishing houses, film studios, and broadcasters-can effectively
check other entities' and associations' deployment of their power by
exposing it to the light of public opinion. Indeed, only a mass media
can both catalyze and, to a degree, embody public opinion in the
face of government authority and corporate fiefdom. 147
Moreover, in addition to their watchdog function, media en-
terprises serve a vital role in laying a foundation for public dis-
course. Internet discussion groups and other diverse, decentralized
fora devoted to individuals' particular views and concerns are
highly significant, laudable components of our system of free ex-
pression. But a discursive realm consisting solely of such fora,
without any mass media, would yield little more than self-
congratulatory refrain.1l 8 It would be a realm in which many indi-
viduals lock in existing preferences, speaking only to those who
share common views and interests, rather than engaging in dis-
course across the political and cultural spectrum. 149 In contrast, lib-
eral democratic governance requires, and the Free Speech Principle
must entail, not merely expression from diverse sources but also
147. In a sense the media itself often acts as the public to which the democratic process re-
sponds. See PROTESS ET AL., supra note 144, at 244-49 (noting, on the basis of detailed case
studies of investigative reporting, that government officials tend to respond to investigative
reporters and media exposbs before interest groups or the public at large take up the issue,
treating the press as if it were the public).
148. For discussion of the problem of excessive insularity in the context of the Internet, see
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 180 (1999); SHAPIRO, supra note 37,
at 105-09; Netanel, supra note 29, at 462-63. Of course, the likelihood of considerable audience
fragmentation in the face of the broadband Internet and multitudinous-channel television raises
the question of whether we will continue to have a mass media in anything like the sense we
know it today. I think we will. First, existing data suggests that, despite some fragmentation,
mass appeal network television is likely to continue to dominate media consumption in the
United States for the foreseeable future. See WEBSTER & PHALEN, supra note 17, at 144. Per-
haps this is because individuals' desire to see what others are seeing balances their desire to
custom-design their speech consumption menu to suit their personal idiosyncratic interests. See
supra note 100-03 and accompanying text; see also Webster & Lin, supra note 46 (finding, on the
basis of a study of Internet usage, that people "opt for a more varied diet than the worst fears [of
customized tunnel vision] would suggest'). Second, although digital media enables asynchronous
delivery, even if individuals do not view the same content at the same time, they may reconsti-
tute a mass audience by viewing it at different times. See WEBSTER & PHALEN, supra note 17, at
114. Finally, concentration of speaker ownership and media herd behavior suggest that even the
future Internet will contain a large core of mainstream information and opinion. See Sunstein,
supra note 14, at 515-16 (discussing media herd behavior).
149. Indeed, as studies of group psychology suggest, discursive insularity may well promote
great polarization and extremism, not merely stasis. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE LAW OF GROUP
POLARIZATION (University of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 91 (2d Se-
ries), 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.taf?28665&_UserRefer-
ence=A7FA65BC8A15900339F0927D.
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robust debate among contrary views. 150 It requires some measure of
public discourse, some means for identifying issues of widespread
concern and some forum for confronting opposing perspectives. 151
Left on its own, the diverse sources prong of the Free Speech Prin-
ciple breeds atomistic insularity. It is the robust debate prong-one
that entails a cross-sectoral exchange of views-that combines with
the diverse sources prong to make the Free Speech Principle a cor-
nerstone of liberal democratic governance.
Of course, media outlets do not serve merely as passive con-
duits for discursive exchange. Rather, they present a forum for me-
diated and edited deliberation and debate. In so doing, the media
both delimits a range of passable opinion and actively contributes
to shaping a rough consensus regarding what are the important
public issues that need to be addressed. 152 Such media agenda-
setting has positive as well as negative ramifications. The mass
media indeed narrows the public agenda to a limited set of resonant
issues. 153 But while a limited agenda might seem antithetical to the
Free Speech Principle's diversity prong, public debate in a highly
pluralistic, advanced democratic state cannot proceed without some
measure of broad public consensus on the major priorities of the
day.
The need for media filtering and agenda-setting is particu-
larly apparent with respect to the Internet. Without trusted inter-
mediaries to serve as filters and guides, citizens who are awash in
cheap information would likely face considerable difficulties in
evaluating that information's accuracy and in assessing the relative
150. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 605 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that "the robust debate of public issues" is the "essence of
self-governmen'); see also STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 179-81 (1995) (discussing John Stuart Mills' thesis that liberal state re-
quires a robust exchange of views).
151. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 186-87 (1997) (contending
that liberal democracy requires a realm of discursive exchange in which citizens can test their
preferences and produce better collective decisions).
152. For further discussion of this point, see Netanel, supra note 129, at 263-67. See also
Owen M. Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (1999) (noting that
television, unlike today's computer communication, has the capacity to create a shared under-
standing among a mass audience).
153. See Maxwell McCombs et al., Issues in the News and the Public Agenda: The Agenda-
Setting Tradition, in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATIONS OF CONSENT 281, 292 (Theo-
dore L. Glasser & Charles T. Salmon eds., 1995) [hereinafter PUBLIC OPINION] (noting that given
competition among issues for saliency among the public, the public agenda typically consists of
no more than five to seven issues).
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import of purported issues. 154 Only media financially and institu-
tionally capable of checking facts and holding a stake in industry-
wide standards of quality, candor, and accuracy can serve as rea-
sonably reliable sources of the information upon which both indi-
vidual elucidation and public discourse depend.155 A realm com-
posed entirely of yeomen speakers would more resemble impenetra-
ble babble than the public square of discursive exchange that the
Free Speech Principle envisions.
Let me emphasize that I do not mean to idealize the com-
mercial media. In performing its watchdog and discourse-enabling
functions, the commercial media skews as well as narrows public
debate. 156 Part of the reason for this, and one that appears increas-
ingly to be so as media enterprises consolidate into conglomerates
with non-media corporate parents, is that media enterprise self-
interest and concern for the bottom line pushes coverage to favor
commercial interests. 157 Media's skewing also grows out of market
dictate, both real and perceived. Sensationalism, a mainstream
worldview, and reporting that focuses on current political leaders
and dominant institutions sells better to broader audiences than
alternative content. 158 Moreover, media exhibit considerable herd
behavior, imitating the format of existing commercially successful
movies, books, and TV shows, thus exacerbating the homogenized,
uniform character of much media content. 159 As a result of these
factors and others, 160 while the mainstream mass media may often
exhibit moderate-reform-oriented norms, it rarely challenges our
basic social, economic, and political structures. 161 Nor, for better or
154. See SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 188-92 (discussing need for trusted intermediaries to
sort out bad data from good); SUNSTEIN, supra note 151, at 185-87 (same). For a colorful depic-
tion of this problem, see DAVID SHENK, DATA SMOG: SURVIVING THE INFORMATION GLuT (1997).
155. For further discussion of this point, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
156. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
157. See Neuborne, supra note 140, at 280.
158. As Ed Baker demonstrates, sensationalist violence and sex sell particularly well across
cultures, and thus assume greater portions of media content as markets for that content become
increasingly global. See Baker, supra note 125.
159. See Netanel, supra note 21, at 333-34; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 515-16.
160. With respect to the press, some commentators claim that reporters' dependence on gov-
ernment officials and prominent, well-organized associations for raw news material also vitiates
radical challenges to the status quo. See, e.g., Clarice N. Olen et al., Conflict, Consensus, and
Public Opinion, in PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 153, at 301, 306 (noting media dependency on
power relationships); Weinberg, supra note 10, at 1154-55.
161. Weinberg, supra note 10, at 1157. At the same time, critics charge that noncommercial,
government-subsidized media also generally fall well within the mainstream. See FRANK
WEBSTER, THEORIES OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 107 (1995) (noting that the BBCs presenta-
tion of public affairs has generally "limited itself to the boundaries of established party politics").
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for worse, does it provide a full spectrum of fathomable expression
and opinion.
On the other hand, however, at least within a moderate re-
form-oriented framework, the presence and activity of market-
based mass media watchdogs serve as an important check on both
government and private entity malfeasance. And critical to this
watchdog presence are the media's ability to reach a mass audience
and the media's reputation as a relatively reliable source of infor-
mation.
The story of former tobacco company researcher Jeffrey Wig-
and is a case in point.162 While employed at cigarette-maker Brown
& Williamson, Wigand discovered that, despite repeated public de-
nials and testimony under oath to the contrary, leading tobacco
company executives had long known that the nicotine in cigarettes
is an addictive substance. In 1995 Wigand relayed his discovery to a
reporter for the widely watched CBS news magazine, 60 Minutes,
and agreed to be interviewed on the program. In so doing, Wigand
violated his Brown & Williamson non-disclosure agreement and
undertook considerable financial and personal risk. Instrumental in
Wigand's decision to divulge the tobacco company misdeeds despite
that risk was CBS's promise to indemnify him for any liability to
his former employer and, no less important, the knowledge that he
would have the opportunity to present his findings before millions
of prime time television viewers. 163 It is highly unlikely that Wig-
and would have exposed Brown & Williamson at his own peril with-
out the backing and mass audience of a major media outlet. And
even if he had, perhaps by posting information and documents on
his personal web page, his story may well have been lost in the cho-
rus of tobacco company denials (if they had even bothered to re-
spond) and against the backdrop of tens of thousands of crank web
pages presenting sundry allegations that few find credible even
when true.
Of course, there is more to the Wigand story. CBS manage-
ment initially scuttled the Wigand interview shortly before it was to
appear on 60 Minutes. Apparently, CBS did want to take the un-
likely, but not immaterial risk of having to pay a multi-billion dol-
lar damage award to Brown & Williamson, especially since that
162. My account of the Wigand story draws heavily upon Paul Starr, What You Need to Beat
Goliath, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 20, 1999, available at http:l/www.prospect.org/archiveslVll-
3/starr.html.
163. Some ten million households watch 60 Minutes each week. See Fiss, supra note 152, at
1217 (citing research performed by Nielsen Media Research on 1998 television viewing).
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contingency would have reduced CBS's share price at a time when
the company was negotiating to be acquired by Westinghouse. Addi-
tional, and more insidious, corporate entanglements might have
also contributed to the decision. 164 Laurence Tisch, CBS's chairman
at the time, was also an owner of Lorillard Tobacco Company, and
his son Andrew was Lorillard's president. In fact, Andrew Tisch
was one of the tobacco executives who had sworn before Congress
that nicotine was not addictive, and Wigand was a witness in the
perjury investigation regarding that testimony. 165 At that time,
moreover, Lorillard was negotiating with Brown & Williamson to
buy six of its brands. 166 In sum, CBS's broadcast of the Wigand in-
terview might have caused CBS and Laurence Tisch considerable
financial loss and might have helped send Tisch's son to jail, facts
that could hardly have been lost on the CBS lawyers and executives
involved in the decision to cancel the Wigand broadcast. 167
The circumstances surrounding CBS's cancellation of the
Wigand interview graphically illustrate the potential vulnerabili-
ties and limitations of the media-as-watchdog model, especially in
an age of increasing media consolidation and conglomeration. But
some three months after the Wigand interview was to have been
aired, CBS reversed its decision to scuttle the interview and did in
fact broadcast it; and in so doing, it dealt a significant blow to the
tobacco industry. Significantly, it was the presence and coverage of
competing media that pushed a reluctant CBS into reasserting its
watchdog role. CBS broadcast the Wigand interview only after the
New York Times had detailed CBS's capitulation in a front page
story,168 the New York Daily News had obtained and reported on
the transcript of the omitted interview, 169 and the Wall Street Jour-
nal had published Wigand's deposition testimony containing his
central allegations. 170 Moreover, critical media coverage did not end
with the CBS broadcast. Most notably perhaps, in its 1999 motion
picture, The Insider, Disney/ABC presented a widely-acclaimed
164. See Starr, supra note 162.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See Bill Carter, '60 Minutes' Ordered to Pull Interview in Tobacco Report, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1995, at Al.
169. See Joe Calderone & Kevin Flynn, What '60 Minutes' Cut: Attack on Cig Maker Was
Axed, Transcript Shows, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 17, 1995, at 2.
170. See Bill Carter, CBS Broadcasts Interview With Tobacco Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
1996, at B8 (reporting that CBS broadcasted the interview a week after the Wall Street Journal
had published the transcript of the Wigand deposition).
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dramatized version of the entire Wigand episode, castigating CBS
for the network's striking, if temporary, abdication of its journalis-
tic integrity. That contemporaneous and subsequent coverage by
competing media enterprises, an instance of such enterprises ex-
posing each other's wrongdoing, may deter such lapses in the fu-
ture.
The moral I wish to draw from this story is not that "all's
well that ends well," that we can complacently rely on an increas-
ingly consolidated mass media to expose corporate wrongdoing.
Rather, the Wigand story illustrates both that mass media entities
are critical to exposing government and corporate wrongdoing, and
that media's propensity and capability to act as watchdog cannot be
taken for granted. Government media policy must actively foster
the media's checking function through cross-ownership and consoli-
dation restrictions, subsidizing non-commercial media outlets, and
other measures designed to support a multiplicity of expressive
sources.
In that connection, our system of expression should include
considerable space for decentralized, individual expression, such as
on the Internet. In addition to constituting a vast forum for alterna-
tive discourses, the Internet spawns gadflies, media critics, and
others who may sometimes successfully bring a story to mass media
attention or challenge media silence. 7 1 But that is not to say that
we should aspire, even as a liberal democratic ideal, to an egalitar-
ian expressive universe composed entirely of virtual and street-
corner pamphleteers. Rather, our system of free expression must
include a plurality of speaker types, including commercial mass
media, government-subsidized noncommercial media, 172 independ-
171. An already classic example is Matt Drudge's web site scoop of the Monica Lewinsky
story. See SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 41.
172. In many democratic countries, state-funded television and other media play important,
perhaps even vital, watchdog and discourse-building roles. However, incidents abound of even
democratic governments seeking to use the power of the purse to extract influence over the
speech of state-funded media. See ELI NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 96-97 (1991) (chronicling
decades of post-war French government attempts to influence coverage on state-run French
television and radio); Furore over IRA Film Could Put Peace Talks in Jeopardy, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), July 27, 1997, at 1 (noting that under a United Kingdom government
ban, Sinn Fein representatives were not allowed to speak on British television until 1993); see
also Frances H. Foster, Information and the Problem of Democracy: The Russian Experience, 44
AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 257-58 (1996) (detailing instances of government censorship in the sup-
posed "defense of democracy" in post-Soviet Russia); cf. FRANCES STONOR SAUNDERS, THE
CULTURAL COLD WAR; THE CIA AND THE WORLD OF ARTS AND LETTERS (1999) (documenting the
CIA's covert funding of select academic conferences, magazines, and cultural activities in post-
war Europe in an effort to lure Western European intelligentsia away from its fascination with
Marxism toward a more favorable understanding of the American woridview). Accordingly,
while state-funded media can contribute significantly to liberal democratic governance, they
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ent publishers, political and nonprofit associations, universities,
and individuals. To some extent, each of these speaker types offsets,
complements, and checks the rest. Like other speaker types, the
commercial media plays a unique and vital role within this complex
mix.
Liberal democratic values would thus be ill-served by speech
hierarchy's eradication, even assuming that a regime of cheap
speech and no-copyright could make that possible. Media and in-
formation policy should rather seek to accommodate speech hierar-
chy while containing its dimensions and blunting its most severe
adverse effects. The Free Press Principle, and, indeed, the Free
Speech Principle as well, demand that we preserve and promote a
robust, autonomous mass media, even as we strive to foster expres-
sive diversity in the face of media concentration and mainstream-
ing.
V. COPYRIGHT'S PROPER ROLE
I have argued thus far that copyright contributes signifi-
cantly to market hierarchy in public discourse, but that such hier-
archy is conducive to liberal democratic governance and values so
long as it is leaves ample room for expression from a multiplicity of
sources. The optimal mix of speech hierarchy versus source diver-
sity can hardly be discerned with anything even remotely approxi-
mating mathematical precision. Very broadly, liberal democratic
governance requires sufficient concentration of expressive resources
to yield a media capable of checking other powerful entities, but
also sufficient speaker diversity to challenge media complacency
and provide widespread opportunities for personal and minority
expression. Media and information policy can aim only to afford a
measure of support for both the Free Speech and Free Press Princi-
ples while seeking to reach a rough accommodation between the
Principles when they inevitably conflict.
Among other policies and regulatory schemes, copyright law
can serve as a useful tool for such accommodation. By according
copyright owners a limited proprietary entitlement in authors' ex-
pressive works, copyright has the salutary effect of helping to sup-
port a robust, independent media.173 Copyright protection does not
ought no more comprise the entirety of our system of free expression than should yeomen speak-
ers and Internet discussion groups. The Free Press Principle-and liberal democratic govern-
ance-must rely as well and in large part on financially and politically autonomous commercial
media.
173. For further discussion of this point, see Netanel, supra note 21, at 352-62.
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merely afford authors, publishers, broadcasters, filmmakers, and
the press a financial incentive to create and disseminate original
expression. It also supports a sector of creators and publishers who
earn financial support for their activities by reaching paying audi-
ences rather than by depending on government or elite largess. In-
deed, copyright helps to enable commercial media to amass suffi-
cient consumer surplus to fund the democracy-enhancing func-
tions-checking governmental and private power centers, repre-
senting public opinion, laying foundations for public discourse, and
serving as a relatively trustworthy source of information-embod-
ied in the Free Press Principle.
Yet, as I have discussed above, in fulfilling this structural
function, copyright fosters and contributes to speech hierarchy. The
copyright incentive is enjoyed disproportionately by corporate enti-
ties holding vast inventories of expressive works, while the burden
to obtain permission to use existing works falls most heavily on in-
dividuals and other non-conglomerate speakers. Conglomerate
owners, moreover, employ copyright strategically to manage content
portfolios, effectively stifling competing and controversial deriva-
tive uses of that content. Copyright thus does not merely enable
rich speakers to become richer. It also directly skews public dis-
course in favor of wealthy entities that control a large share of our
expressive universe.
Copyright law has traditionally been tailored to moderate
copyright's most pernicious, hierarchy-entrenching effects. It has
imposed considerable limits on copyright owners' legal entitlement
to control expression, and those limits, together with technological
constraints on copyright owner control, have preserved rich possi-
bilities for critical exchange and diverse reformulation of existing
works. 174 But that moderating force has greatly dissipated as copy-
right's scope has steadily expanded, media enterprises have con-
solidated and amassed ever-larger content inventories, and digital
encryption has enabled content providers to achieve near hermetic
control over those inventories.
Given all these factors, indeed, copyright's ever more bloated
scope seems far to exceed that which would be necessary or desir-
174. Such public interest limits lie at the heart of United States copyright jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (stating that copyrighes
goal of promoting science and the arts is "generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works" and emphasizing that such works "lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright'). While their role in continental European
copyright law is less pronounced, they are far from absent in that "authors' rights" regime. See
Netanel, supra note 129, at 305-06.
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able to further copyright's role in supporting an independent media
without unduly hampering expressive diversity. If copyright is to
serve both the Free Speech and Free Press Principles, it must en-
rich the public domain no less than subsidize media enterprises.
While continuing to underwrite a robust sector of independent pub-
lishers, it must provide substantial breathing room for critical, con-
troversial, and competing reformulations of existing expression.
More particularly, although I cannot develop the argument here, 175
I would contend that in order properly to accommodate those twin,
yet partly competing goals, copyright law ought to incorporate a
reinvigorated fair use doctrine; a scaled-back term of protection;
something approaching a liability, rather than property, regime for
most derivative uses of existing works; and the application of copy-
right entitlement limitations to content provider rights under the
Digital Millenium Copyright Act, rather than the pay-for-access
and perpetual protection that the Act appears to make possible.
Such a regime would continue to furnish plentiful funding for an
independent media sector. But it would act towards dismantling
much of the excessive speech hierarchy that copyright increasingly
serves to buttress.
Significantly in that regard, copyright law offers some ad-
vantages over traditional media regulation in addressing the issue
of speaker hierarchy, especially in an age of global, digital media
markets. Traditional "command-and-control" media regulation aims
to promote expressive diversity by imposing requirements regard-
ing media content or regulating media industry structure. 176 Under
the fairness doctrine, for example, the Federal Communications
Commission long required television and radio broadcasters both to
cover public issues and to present a diversity of views regarding
those issues. 177 Other content regulation has required that media
accord access to speakers who might not otherwise reach a mass
audience, including requirements that cable operators set aside
channels for "public, educational, or governmental use" without
charge. 178 Structural regulation focuses on ownership restrictions
175. For further discussion of some of these points, see Netanel, supra note 21, at 364-85.
176. For a brief history and summary of broadcast content regulations, see Sunstein, supra
note 14, at 506-08. For a brief history and summary of media ownership and structural regula-
tions, see Levi, supra note 12, at 582-92.
177. The fairness doctrine was largely repealed in 1987. See Syracuse Peace Council v. Tele-
vision Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5052-55 (1987), affd sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v.
FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
178. Federal law permits local franchising authorities to require that cable operators desig-
nate channel capacity for "public, educational, or governmental use" without charge. 47 U.S.C. §
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designed to limit media concentration. It has included restrictions
on cross-ownership among different media and on the number of
media outlets and percentage of specified markets that a single en-
tity may control.179
Traditional media regulation has been designed for predigi-
tal domestic markets, particularly those, such as off-air broadcast-
ing and cable television, that have been characterized by limited
communications capacity and private entity control over physical
bottlenecks to access. Even within those market segments, media
regulation has been of uncertain effectiveness, with critics pre-
senting cogent arguments that the untoward effect of much regula-
tion has been to inhibit, rather than promote, expressive
diversity. 180 Moreover, traditional media regulation faces significant
obstacles in an era of digital and global media markets. Digitization
brings the convergence of media sectors, like television, that have
been traditionally been subject to considerable regulation, with sec-
tors, like the dissemination of printed text, which have traditionally
operated with little content or structural regulation. The distribu-
tion of content on open digital networks like the Internet also
eliminates, or minimizes, the capacity scarcity and entities' physi-
cal control over distribution bottlenecks that have served as the
rationale for much media regulation and, indeed, may well be cen-
tral to the permissibility of such regulation under the First
531 (1994). Although I refer to such compelled access provisions as content rather than struc-
tural regulation, it is unlikely, at least in the near future, that they would be deemed content-
based restrictions on speech for First Amendment purposes. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), the Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that federal law requir-
ing cable television operators to carry local off-air broadcasts was content-neutral regulation
designed to "protect[ ] noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting service
due to competition from cable systems," id. at 663 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)), and to serve the interrelated goal of "promoting the widespread dis-
semination of information from a multiplicity of sources," id. at 662.
179. See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. The "subscriber limits provision" of that Act directs the FCC to
limit the number of subscribers a cable operator may reach. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (1994). The
"channel occupancy provision" directs the Commission to limit the number of channels on a cable
system that may be devoted to video programming in which the operator has a financial interest.
Id. § 533(f)(1)(B); see also Stefaan Verhulst, European Responses to Media Ownership and Plu-
ralism, 16 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 421, 422 (1998) (noting that the United Kingdom and
Germany "have replaced the classic approach, which was mainly based on ownership restric-
tions, with one based on market shares").
180. See, e.g., Benjamin L Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on Content: Does it Matter?,
13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 755, 764 (1995) (providing examples of broadcaster attempts to
break significantly out of the programming mainstream that have been dealt with harshly by the
FCC); Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a "Chilling Effect'? Evi-
dence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1997) (arguing that the
fairness doctrine discouraged stations from covering controversial issues at all).
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Amendment. 181 Finally, digitization speeds the globalization of me-
dia markets and the transnational consolidation of media firms,
making it difficult to determine the relevant market parameters for
capping media centralization and difficult for national regulators to
impose such caps even if the relevant parameters can be deter-
mined. 8 2
Delimiting copyright owner rights to control expression
might constitute a more flexible and effective tool than command-
and-control regulation for modulating between speech hierarchy
and expressive diversity in the digital environment. 1 3 By reallo-
cating underlying entitlements to control and use expression, a
suitably tailored copyright would lower the costs of expression for
non-conglomerate users. In so doing, it would support the viability
of diverse uses and reformulations of existing expression, and
would do so across media sectors, markets, and formats. It would
also benefit a broad spectrum of non-conglomerate speakers, not
just those whom government regulators have determined ought to
have privileged access to media outlets. At the same time, a tailored
copyright would counter media concentration arising from condi-
tions in digital markets. Unlike much traditional media regulation,
it would not be limited to situations of media or telecommunications
enterprise control over physical bottlenecks. At the same time,
however, legislation that narrows copyright entitlements would not
give rise to the potential First Amendment obstacles facing com-
181. For commentary taking the position that both structural and content regulation are
constitutionally infirm in the digital network environment, see PETER HUBER, LAW AND
DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM
(1997). See also Review of the Comm'n's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broad. and Ca-
blelMDS Interests, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,559, 12,664 (1999) (Commissioner
Furchtgott-Roth, dissenting in part and concurring in part) (challenging constitutionality of FCC
broadcast and cable regulation); Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC
Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 401 (1989) (arguing that the FCC broadcast owner-
ship restrictions abridge the First Amendment right to free speech); Sunstein, supra note 14, at
503 (raising the "large question" of whether traditional "command-and-contror' public interest
broadcast regulation continues to make policy sense or "even to survive constitutional scrutiny"
in the new communications environment); Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig, Net Gains: Will
Technology Make CBS Unconstitutional?, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 1998, at 12, 14 (contending
that broadcast regulation may run afoul of the First Amendment if "spread-spectrum technology"
enables multiple, non-interfering uses of spectrum frequencies). But see Baker, supra note 20, at
80-82, 93-114 (arguing that concentration and market power do and should suffice to justify
selective media regulation in the interest of promoting expressive diversity).
182. See Verhulst, supra note 179, at 421 (questioning whether, given transnational media
consolidation, "national attempts to control ownership are still feasible or even useful").
183. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 531-63 (exploring possibilities for replacing traditional
command-and-control media regulation with a "third way," including disclosure requirements,
economic incentives, and voluntary self-regulation).
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mand-and-control regulation of new media enterprises and
activity.18 4 And finally, while copyright laws are national in scope,
they apply to all domestic uses. 185 A tailored copyright may thus
support expressive diversity without requiring a complex determi-
nation of national media concentration within a global market.
184. No court or, to my knowledge, commentator has suggested that content providers enjoy
a First Amendment right to copyright protection. Indeed, courts and commentators have long
maintained the opposite, that the First Amendment imposes limits on the scope and duration of
copyright owner prerogatives, whether directly or through the incorporation First Amendment
values into copyright doctrine. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (explaining that First Amendment protections are "embodied in the Copy-
right Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas");
New Era Publications Intl v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 588 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that the imposition of a permanent injunction in the copyright infringement
action before the court would diminish public knowledge and thus implicate First Amendment
concerns); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170
(9th Cir. 1977) (stating that copyright law's idea-expression dichotomy serves to accommodate
First Amendment concerns); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional
Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 289-99 (1979) (attempting to
structure a workable accommodation between the First Amendment and the property rights
granted by federal copyright law); Goldstein, supra note 89, at 988-1055 (outlining possible con-
flicts between copyright law and the First Amendment); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (con-
tending that preliminary injunctions in copyright cases should be treated as prior restraints
under First Amendment doctrine); Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 185, 204-06 (criticizing judicial pronouncements that copy-
right doctrine adequately reflects First Amendment free speech protections); Melville B. Nim-
mer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186-1204 (1970) (attempting to reconcile copyright with the First Amend-
ment); e. Daniel A. Farber, Afterword. Property and Free Speech, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239, 1240-
42 (1999) (suggesting that some media regulation ought to be reconceived as an allocation of
proprietary entitlements rather than command-and-control regulation and thus ought more
readily to pass First Amendment muster).
185. International copyright law aims to achieve greater harmonization among national laws
and to prevent discrimination against foreign authors, but not to replace national law. See
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised
July 24, 1971, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 5 (requiring national
treatment); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81, art. 1(1) (1994) (provid-
ing that signatory countries may implement in their domestic intellectual property laws more
extensive protection than required by Agreement); id. art. 3(1) (requiring that signatory coun-
tries apply the principle of national treatment). Under choice of law principles applicable in
copyright infringement actions, the issue of whether a given use of a copyright-protected work
constitutes copyright infringement is generally determined by the law of the country where the
use took place. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 91 (2d
Cir. 1998); (Jerusalem Dist. Ct.) Qimron v. Shanks, (1993) 69 (3) P.M. 10, 21-22, affd, C.A.
2790/93, 2811/93 (Israel Supreme Court, August 30, 2000).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The deepening of market hierarchy in public discourse un-
derscores a tension between the Free Speech and Free Press Princi-
ples that cannot ultimately be resolved. It is the ongoing task of
media and information policy in a liberal democratic state to fur-
ther both Principles while seeking to modulate between the two.
Copyright law has significant import for that effort. Indeed, the
support of some degree of speech hierarchy counts among copy-
right's quintessential benefits to the extent that support helps to
underwrite a robust, independent media without unduly burdening
expressive diversity. But copyright's current expanded scope, cou-
pled with ongoing media enterprise consolidation and content pro-
viders' potential widespread deployment of digital encryption tech-
nology, gives far less weight to promoting expressive diversity than
need or ought to be the case. If copyright is to lend a hand in fur-
thering both the Free Speech and Free Press Principles and con-
structively moderating the tension between them, it must be more
carefully and narrowly tailored to those ends. If copyright is so tai-
lored, it may prove to be a valuable supplement or even partial re-
placement for traditional media regulation in seeking to accommo-
date speech hierarchy and expressive diversity, particularly in digi-
tal and global media markets.
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